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ABSTRACT
Flipping a coin to decide a case is among the most serious forms
of judicial misconduct. Yet judges react quite differently to other
types of lotteries. Judges tend to tolerate or encourage deliberately
random decisions in nonjudicial settings ranging from military
drafts to experimental welfare requirements. Equally striking, most
adjudicators now embrace randomization within their own institu-
tions: they commonly use lotteries to assign incoming cases to each
other. This practice creates a remarkable tension. Because adjudica-
tors vary in competence and ideology, randomizing their case assign-
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ments will effectively randomize outcomes in a subset of merits
decisions. We might then ask whether the typical adjudicative system
is sometimes at war with itself, condemning courtroom coin flips
while operating backroom lotteries with similar effects.
This Article attempts to defend the judicial treatment of random-
ized decisions. The Article begins by investigating the concept of
randomization and the leading justifications for randomizing social
decisions. It then offers a consequentialist defense for the pattern of
judicial reactions to official lotteries. This defense admits that case-
assignment lotteries have merits-randomizing effects, and it accepts
that a merits-randomization ban might be the best rule for fallible
judges facing public relations problems. Even so, random case
assignment can be justified based on three consequences, aside from
the convenience of judges: (1) fairly allocating to litigants the
tragically scarce and indivisible resource of judicial excellence, (2)
roughly honoring the politics of the judicial appointments process,
and (3) continuing a natural experiment on the determinants of
judicial behavior. These arguments cannot explain why adjudicative
institutions developed as they did. But they can exploit various social
benefits that the system has produced, in a sense, randomly.
[Vol. 51:001
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INTRODUCTION
A perceived divide between randomization and justice is centuries
old in the Western world. Both the Goddess of Fortune and the
Goddess of Justice have been depicted as blindfolded, but Justitia
holds a scale while Fortuna scatters her rewards without any such
guide.1 The cultural situation is not radically different today. In the
United States, the favored icon for justice remains the same: a
decision maker veiled from irrelevant facts and attuned to law
rather than whim or chance.
Randomization has a poor reputation in judicial rhetoric as well.
As early as 1811 an American judge wrote that "[t]he decision of a
contested case by lot or chance must be reprobated by every honest
man."2 More recently, judges have sanctioned other judges for
flipping coins to resolve disputes, intimated that executive discre-
tion should not extend to decision by lot, and invalidated an entire
system of capital punishment for resembling random lightning
strikes.' Although rolling dice may entertain or guide individuals in
their personal lives,4 it might be considered inconsistent with the
rudiments of a just government.
Despite these first impressions, judicial opposition to randomiza-
tion turns out to be modest. It is nearly impossible to locate a case
invalidating an official decision because it was deliberately random-
ized. True, pervasive randomization would often bump into
generally accepted judicial commitments; flipping coins to deter-
mine guilt in every criminal case is incompatible with a commit-
ment to judgments based on legally relevant evidence. But such
incidental conflicts do not entail judicial opposition to randomization
1. See Lorraine Daston, Life, Chance & Life Chances, D&DALUS, Winter 2008, at 5, 6
("Fortuna is a powerful goddess, but it is Justitia who commands the moral high ground.").
2. Lessee of Cluggage v. Swan, 4 Binn. 150, 153 (Pa. 1811) (Yeates, J.) (discussing
verdicts, but concluding juror testimony should not be admissible to prove lot-drawing).
3. See infra Part II.A.1, II.B.1.
4. See, e.g., STEVEN LEVY, THE PERFECT THING: How THE IPOD SHUFFLES COMMERCE,
CULTURE, AND COOLNESS 227-54 (2006) (discussing randomization and shuffle play on the
iPod); GERDA REITH, THE AGE OF CHANCE: GAMBLING IN WESTERN CULTURE 127-55 (1999)
(discussing gambling as, in part, thrill-seeking through uncertainty and its resolution); cf.
Farnsworth v. Sanford, 115 F.2d 375,377 (5th Cir. 1940) (reporting that the petitioner flipped
a coin to decide whether to plead nolo contendere).
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per se. In fact, courts might be as likely to order randomization as
to forbid it. Apparently no one even asked a judge to condemn the
1969 Vietnam military draft lottery for relying on randomiza-
tion-but this lottery actually was challenged for being not random
enough, and a federal judge took the complaint quite seriously.5
Is it possible to distinguish situations in which courts are likely
to resist randomization (for example, capital sentencing) from those
in which they are likely to be indifferent or even promote it (for
example, military drafts)? High stakes cannot be the distinguishing
feature; randomization is sometimes tolerated in matters of life and
death. A far better predictor, I will argue, is institutional location.
Although relevant cases are few, judicial opposition to randomiza-
tion looks parochial. Judges strongly condemn randomization for
their own merits decisions to the point of imposing professional
sanctions, yet judges are likely to retreat when other officials
consciously randomize. If this is the pattern, then judicial opposition
to randomization is restricted to self-regulation.
The question is whether judges are right to expel randomization
from their merits decisions and not elsewhere. A defense of this
pattern has become more challenging because, in an important
respect, adjudication is now shot through with randomization. The
decision makers themselves-judges and jurors-are typically
assigned their cases through lotteries. Random case assignment
takes place hundreds of thousands of times every year in courts
across the country, and many administrative agencies follow suit.'
Only later stages of adjudication provoke allergies to randomization.
But because the pool of decision makers differs in competence and
ideology, random case assignment will influence an untold number
of case outcomes.7 The greater the diversity across decision makers,
the greater the likely influence of a case assignment lottery. This is
true even if the system is dead-set against overtly randomizing
merits decisions. In the least charitable terms, then, courts have
come to exemplify what they so loudly condemn.
5. See Stodolsky v. Hershey, 2 Selective Serv. L. Rptr. 3527, 3528-29 (W.D. Wis. 1969);
infra Part II.B.2 (examining Stodolsky and examples of court support for randomization).
6. See infra Part II.C (describing some case assignment systems, the murky history of
their development, and the limits on randomization within these systems).
7. See infra Part III.A (discussing the interaction of "ideology " competence," assignment
systems, and case outcomes).
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Can we defend an adjudicative system that habitually randomizes
its decision makers but never their decisions?8 The question is worth
asking because we can imagine a system closer to the opposite of the
status quo. Cases could be assigned to judges based on their
perceived expertise, or the combined preferences of the litigants,9
and these nonrandom assignment systems could be accompanied by
a modest domain of merits decisions that are concluded by lot. If
there is a convincing defense of the current arrangement, moreover,
it should rest on more than judges' preferences. Random case
assignment ignores important differences among judges, while
refusing to randomize merits decisions encourages the proliferation
of other contestable tiebreakers.'
My defense of the system's design comes in several steps. As to
the ban on randomizing merits decisions, it is the only acceptable
flat rule for when to randomize and, I will suggest, a flexible stan-
dard is problematic. This conclusion is not firm but it draws on a
reasonable view of imperfect judges and their public relations
8. For recognition of the combination without much defense, see NEIL DuXBURY, RANDOM
JUSTICE: ON LOTTERIES AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING 74-75 (1999) (discussing litigant
acceptance of jury selection). For a brief argument in favor of "neutral" case assignment
standing alone, see J. Robert Brown & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at
the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1040-41 & n.16, 1066-69 (2000) (arguing that a
neutral assignment system restrains judges from deliberately influencing outcomes via
assignment) and Sheldon Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 461, 481-82 (discussing advantages of dialogue within a court
system). For the thought that random assignment, unlike randomization on the merits,
preserves "the opportunity to persuade a rational arbiter" in controversial cases, see John E.
Coons, Consistency, 75 CAL. L. REv. 59, 110 (1987). Coons's article is an extended meditation
on the value of consistency in law. More specifically, he identifies and evaluates legal rules
that seem to authorize inconsistent remedies across similar cases, see id. at 76-92, and he
offers justifications for "inconsistency-by-rule" based on the virtues of decentralized decision
making, participation, and viewpoint diversity on contested issues, see id. at 109-13. His
article is thought-provoking, but his focus was neither randomization nor the relationship
between random case assignment and merits judgments.
9. See, e.g., MAUREEN SOLOMON & DOUGLAS K. SOMERLOT, CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT IN
THE TRIAL COURT: Now AND FOR THE FUTURE 8, 13, 28-29 (1973) (describing older assignment
systems with discretionary judgments by the chief judge); Michael Hasday, Ending the Reign
of Slot Machine Justice, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 291, 298, 310 (2000) (advocating the
assignment of appellate judge panels partly by the rank-order preferences of the parties to a
case); see also Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving
American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 216, 233 (1999) (suggesting balancing of federal
circuit court panels by an ideological proxy).
10. See infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text (collecting tiebreakers).
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challenges. Opposing merits randomization, however, only compli-
cates the argument for assignment randomization. One response is
to cut the tension by claiming that randomizing judges does not
count as randomizing merits decisions, whatever the effect on
outcomes. But there are other defenses. First, we should view the
assignment process as matching judges to litigants, not only cases
to judges. This outsider perspective can accept randomization as a
fair method for allocating a scarce and indivisible resource: judicial
excellence. Second, we should expand our frame of analysis further
to consider the appointments process. The larger system of match-
ing judges to litigants includes the random assignment process now
popular with judges as well as the appointments process that gave
them their offices. Randomizing at the assignment stage can rightly
bow to decisions at the appointments stage regarding the proper
mix of adjudicators. Third, random assignment creates a natural
experiment. Trustworthy empirical study may depend on such
lotteries for insight into judicial behavior. Indeed, these studies are
one way to better learn how judges are different and, therefore, how
the judge assignment system can drive case outcomes.
Part I is largely theoretical and continues modern efforts to
demystify randomization. The discussion highlights several over-
lapping justifications for lotteries and examples of their use in social
decisions. Part II sorts out the judicial position on randomization.
Judicial skepticism of randomization in other institutions is difficult
to find, and judges regularly adopt modified lotteries to assign cases
among themselves. Yet judges almost never overtly randomize their
merits decisions, and those who do risk sanctions beyond reversal.
Part III offers a functional defense for this pattern." The analysis
in this Part accepts that randomizing decision makers effectively
randomizes outcomes for a class of cases, and it admits that the
affected class does not match the ideal domain for merits random-
ization indicated by abstract normative theory. But the system can
be defended by stressing the institutional setting and practical
11. I mean a normative defense based on the beneficial consequences of an arrangement-
not a positive explanation of behavior that works backward from beneficial consequences. See
JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NuTs AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
14 (2007) (discussing the latter). Establishing the normative defense will be difficult enough
without proceeding to establish that any net social benefit was the actual reason for the
arrangement's establishment.
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realities of adjudication. A merits randomization ban might well
be the best approach for fallible judges and, in any event, assign-
ment randomization probably amounts to a sensible lottery of
judges given the competing claims of litigants, the character of
the appointments process, our desire for information on judicial
behavior, and the feasible alternatives. This defense does not track
the actual motives of the system's designers, who were likely driven
by other forces. But the rest of us can appreciate the social benefits
that the system has produced, in a sense, randomly.
I. UNDERSTANDING RANDOMIZATION
Our concern is randomization in decisions that affect third
parties. This indicates a structure of interest: decision makers using
procedures to generate outcomes that affect a pool of subjects. It
should be understood just how many decisions must be made for
this structure to function. Among other choices, the decision makers
must be given positions of power, the pool of affected subjects must
be determined, and a decision rule must be selected. The last point
deserves emphasis. Randomization might be adopted as a decision
rule for good reasons, for bad reasons, or for no discernible reason,
but randomization in this context is always the outcome of a prior
decision-making process. The task is to understand when this
anterior process should select randomization-that is, when deci-
sion makers should decide to decide by randomization.
A. Three Concepts of Randomization
Before addressing that normative question, we should be clear
on which version of randomization is worth analyzing. Sometimes
the term "random" is used to refer to ideas not central to the inquiry
here, such as the absence of a detectible purpose or pattern.
Sometimes terms like "arbitrary" refer to ideas within the heartland
of our concern.
An initial distinction lies between processes and outcomes. Either
can be characterized as random. 2 We can describe the process of
12. See DEBORAH J. BENNErT, RANDOMNESS 165-67 (1998); JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC
JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 40-41 (1989) [hereinafter EISTER,
[Vol. 51:001
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rolling an unweighted die as "random" without commenting on the
pattern of numbers that come up, just as we can describe certain
numerical sequences as more random than others without saying
anything about the process for generating them." Because our focus
is decision-making protocols, process-oriented concepts are most
pertinent. Certainly these processes will be evaluated with reference
to their consequences, 14 but the topic of ultimate concern will
remain the decision-making processes designed to generate results
randomly.
Within the domain of processes, however, randomization can have
more than one meaning. Two leading academic concepts of process
randomization are statistical and epistemic. "A statistically random
process is probably the more intuitive concept. It refers to a process
that affords equal probability to all outcomes within a given set. 6
The set of possible outcomes must be chosen somehow, 7 but, once
specified, any member of the outcome set must be equally likely to
occur when the process is used. This notion of randomization is
commonplace, even if the resulting distributions do not fit common
expectations for "randomness."'" There is also the familiar idea of a
weighted lottery, which is a variation on statistical randomization. 9
SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS].
13. The sequence 01001111 is more "random" in this sense than is 11111111, regardless
of the process by which these numbers were selected for inclusion in this sentence. See
GREGORY J. CHAITIN, EXPLORING RANDOMNESS 111 (2001).
14. Cf. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 169-73 (describing tests for random processes that are
based on outcome distributions).
15. See David Wasserman, Let Them Eat Chances: Probability and Distributive Justice,
12 ECON. & PHIL. 29, 30 (1996); cf. IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY: A
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF EARLY IDEAS ABOUT PROBABILITY, INDUCTION, AND STATISTICAL
INFERENCE 12-13 (1975) (exploring probability theory as related to distributions from chance
processes and degrees of uncertainty).
16. See BENNETT, supra note 12, at 155; Stephen E. Feinberg, Randomization and Social
Affairs: The 1970 Draft Lottery, SCI., Jan. 22, 1971, at 255, 258 (describing the statistician's
idea of an ideally random process).
17. This point will become crucial in the analysis below. See infra Part III.A.2-C (assessing
random case assignment).
18. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM FELLER, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITS
APPLICATIONS 161 (1967) ("[Tlo the untrained eye randomness appears as a regularity or
tendency to cluster."); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment
of Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 32, 36-37
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (similar).
19. See ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 113-14; Douglas C. Wilms,
Georgia's Land Lottery of 1832, 52 CHRON. OF OKLA. 52, 54 (1974) (describing a lottery that
2009]
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It is a compromise process intermediate between equal chances and
other decision rules, such as merit or market allocations.
Statistical randomization, however intuitive, might be purely
theoretical. Innovators have been striving for decades to create
devices that are demonstrably random in a statistical sense.2 °
Dice can be engineered only so well, and approaching statistical
randomness will always depend on the procedure for rolling them.
Computer-administered algorithms generate numbers with incred-
ible efficiency, but they depend on a seed to get them started. If the
seed is not appropriately selected, statistical randomness can be
compromised.21 In fact, perfect statistical randomization might not
even be theoretically possible. Perhaps adequate information before
a randomizing process finishes would invariably preclude the
assurance of equal probabilities. Enough knowledge about physics
and the manner in which a die is rolled should enable an observer
to calculate odds different from one in six.22 To be sure, many
randomization devices are good enough for their assigned purposes
in light of limited observer information. The role of ignorance in
preserving equal probability assumptions does, however, lead to a
distinct concept.
An epistemically random process generates outcomes that are
equally probable as far as an observer can tell.2" This happens
whenever a person is sufficiently ignorant such that it becomes
attractive for her or him to assign equal probabilities to a set of
doubled the chances for veterans, orphans, family heads, and others to win acquired Indian
land). For a scheme weighted as to one class yet unweighted as to another, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Lottery Voting: A Thought Experiment, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 195 (exploring
election of representatives from single member districts by randomly selecting a ballot cast
by a voter in each district).
20. See BENNETT, supra note 12, at 132-51; see also Feinberg, supra note 16, at 258
(calling perfect independence and equal probability "impossible").
21. See, e.g., JONATHAN KNUDSEN, JAVA CRYPTOGRAPHY 22-24 (1998). A web service
advertising "true random numbers" based on seeds from atmospheric noise is available at
http://www.random.org.
22. Cf. XITAO FAN ET AL., SAS FOR MONTE CARLO STUDIES: A GUIDE FOR QUANTITATIVE
RESEARCHERS 25 (2002) (asserting that "no events in nature are truly random"). There is an
odd relationship here to ancient refusals to accept the existence of chance when doing so
threatened a powerful view of divine will or divine planning. See REITH, supra note 4, at 13-15
(discussing shifts in acceptance over time).
23. See BENNETT, supra note 12, at 154; ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12,
at 43.
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possible outcomes, regardless of what omniscience would reveal.
This estimation is most understandable when a process appears
designed to approximate statistical randomization, as with an
apparently unweighted die rolled fairly, but epistemic random-
ness reaches further. Think about an observer who is accurately
informed that a die is loaded but not told how. "For all he knows, no
number is more likely than any other to come up,"" even though the
device is certainly not statistically random in any objective sense.
A real world example is the New York City subway search program,
which attempts to maintain only "the veneer of random deploy-
ment."25 The epistemic concept is thus subjective and allows
randomness to vary across observers.
To be a useful concept, however, epistemic randomness seems to
rely on a tendentious model of ideal rationality or actual human
behavior. Something like the principle of insufficient reason would
have to be accepted, whereby an observer should or will assume
equiprobability across specified outcomes despite uncertainty on
just that point.21 It is not clear that people assume equal probabili-
ties even when a process appears well designed to produce them."
In any event, epistemic randomness captures a useful thought by
underscoring the role of uncertainty in efforts at statistical ran-
domization. It also suggests that "randomness" might be all around
us rather than hopelessly out of reach. Given the difficulties of
prediction in a complex world, perhaps epistemic randomness is
pervasive.
There is a third concept worth mentioning. Use of a decision rule
might be considered randomization if the rule is unrelated to any
normatively sound basis for decision.28 Such decision processes
can be called orthogonally random. True, some decision rules are
24. ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 43.
25. See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260,264 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting the difference between
the intended appearance and the actual basis for choosing subway checkpoints).
26. See ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 43.
27. See, e.g., REITH, supra note 4, at 175 (discussing gamblers).
28. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Just Lotteries, 27 Soc. Sci. INFO. 483,
489-90 (1988) (arguing that a lottery may be fair if "impersonal" in this sense); see also David
Heyd, When Practical Reason Plays Dice, in REASONING PRACTICALLY 58, 62 (Edna Ullmann-
Margalit ed., 2000) (discussing mechanisms "not known to be correlated in any way to the
issue at hand"). I would add to Heyd's discussion that a process can be meaningfully "random"
when the decision rule is known not to correlate with any normative basis for decision.
2009]
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considered both unrelated to a proper view of the merits and
normatively prohibited, like choosing the outcome that will
maximize harm to race minorities. But other grounds for decision
have no such taint. An example familiar to legal scholars is the
convention of listing contributing colleagues' names alphabetically
in the star footnote, which is a decision rule thought utterly
uncorrelated with merit.2" The subway search program provides a
more serious illustration: police officers are instructed to search the
bags of every nth passenger who passes the checkpoint."0
Orthogonal randomization is a spin-off of epistemic randomness,
assuming the decision maker had no reason to believe that any
identifiable pool member was more likely to receive the benefit
when the decision rule was chosen. The process can also be seen as
a convenient substitute for statistical randomization, insofar as the
decision rule is intended to mindlessly allocate resources without
advantage purposefully given to any outcome in the set. Rules truly
detached from normative considerations might be more difficult to
identify and administer than are pseudo-random number genera-
tors, but both can be grouped together.
None of these three concepts is a priori superior. They are
significant for different purposes, and concentrating on one will
spotlight some normative questions to the exclusion of others. For
example, thinking about statistical randomization prompts con-
sideration of the circumstances in which decision makers should
deliberately make outcomes equally probable, despite numerous
alternatives. In contrast, the existence of epistemic randomness can
present transparency issues regarding the propriety of keeping
one class of people ignorant of the operative decision rule. Those
questions are not the same as asking when and what kinds of
substitutes are appropriate for statistical randomization. These
issues are suggested by the possibility of orthogonal randomization.
29. Like statistical randomization, this ordering delivers no information about the quality
of comments provided, but breaking the alphabetizing convention requires an explanation to
avert confusion, and in this Article I have followed the convention. For an instance of co-
authors statistically randomizing the order of their names, perhaps to equalize the chance of
recognition in short citation form regardless of entrenched alphabetical advantage, see Jan
B. Heide et al., Exclusive Dealing and Business Efficiency: Evidence from Industry Practice,
41 J.L. & ECON. 387, 387 n.* (1998) (stating that "all contributed equally to the article").
30. See MacWade, 460 F.3d at 265 (noting the number is specified by a supervisor).
[Vol. 51:001
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All three concepts will be touched on below. But to simplify
matters, the focus will be on attempts at statistical randomization
with a secondary concern for orthogonal randomization. A decision
maker's attempt to assure equal probabilities will be sufficient to
attract our attention-understanding that literal equiprobability
might be impossible, that lack of relevant information might be
required, and that orthogonal randomization might be an acceptable
substitute. Although much of the analysis will apply to epistemic
randomness, the issues surrounding deliberate statistical and
orthogonal randomization are important enough and can be more
cleanly analyzed on their own.
B. Randomization's Features and Justifications
People have turned to deliberate randomization in various
situations and for thousands of years.3' Randomization has been
used to drive shuffle play on iPods,32 to enhance digital audio pro-
cessing,33 to initiate sporting contests and presidential debates, 5
to order candidate names on ballots,36 to resolve election ties 7 and
more casual disagreements, 38 to create samples for opinion polling,39
31. See BENNETT, supra note 12, at 11-12, 17-44 (describing ancient gaming and
divination); DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 43-84 (collecting examples involving social choice).
32. See LEVY, supra note 4, at 177-204 (regarding the initial version of shuffle play).
33. See JOHN WATKINSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO DIGITAL AUDIO 120-22 (2002) (regarding
the dithering process).
34. See INT'L TENNIS FED'N, RULES OF TENNIS 6 (2009) (prescribing a coin toss to allocate
the power to choose serving order); 2003-2004 OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE 168 (Larry Upson ed., 2003) (similar).
35. See The First Presidential Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008 (transcript), available
at http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/debates/transcripts/first-presidential.debate.
html.
36. See Daniel E. Ho & Kosuke Imai, Randomization Inference with Natural Experiments:
An Analysis of Ballot Effects in the 2003 California Recall Election, 101 J. AM. STAT. ASSN
888, 889 (2006).
37. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 105.051(1)(c) (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 5.01(4)(a)
(West 2009); Randal C. Archibold, Election at a Draw, Arizona Town Cuts a Deck, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 2009, at Al.
38. See DOUGLAS WALKER & GRAHAM WALKER, THE OFFICIAL ROCK PAPER SCISSORS
STRATEGY GUIDE 61-73 (2004) (treating the game as one of skill). I consider Rock-Paper-
Scissors an orthogonal randomization device, at least when only one round is played by
amateurs.
39. See THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2005, 378-79 (Alec Gallup & Frank Newport
eds., 2006) (investigating public opinion on sampling by sampling public opinion).
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to measure the unemployment rate,40 to make clinical drug trials
more reliable,41 to pick out travelers for extra law enforcement
screening,42 to promote electronic security through cryptography,4"
and to allocate housing vouchers, 4 charter school slots, 45 immigra-
tion visas,46 and the burden of military service.47 Yet pervasive
statistical randomization would be calamitous; it would yield
indefensible rewards and punishments, destabilize patterns of
behavior, and kill socially valuable incentives. Imagine systematic
randomization of the decisions whether to provide a benefit like
health insurance, the scope of the benefit, and the recipient class.
The results would be unjustifiable.
Randomization has many alternatives, of course. Among them are
(1) judgment based on perceptions of merit, need, or desert and the
related option of delegation to experts; (2) politics, including
collective deliberation and the aggregation of judgments by voting
rules; (3) markets, which translate demand and ability to pay into
resource allocations; (4) equal shares, whether by physical partition
or temporal rotation; and (5) first-in-time rules, which often reward
knowledge, speed, and desire unrelated to wealth.48 Intelligent
selection of randomization over these alternatives requires a
decision maker to pinpoint randomization's peculiar features.
40. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY: CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY 3-4 to 3-13 (2006) (Technical Paper 66) (describing stratified random
sampling).
41. See HENRY M. MARKS, THE PROGRESS OF EXPERIMENT: SCIENCE AND THERAPEUTIC
REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1990, at 132-63 (1997).
42. See United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 615-16, 618 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding
random selection of airline passengers for handheld magnetometer scanning).
43. See KNUDSEN, supra note 21.
44. See Sara Olkon, Many Seek Section 8 Help: CHA Holding Lottery for Waiting List
Spots, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 17, 2008, at Metro 1.
45. See 20 U.S.C. § 7225d(b) (2006) (regarding oversubscribed charter schools receiving
grants); see also Peter Stone, What Can Lotteries Do for Education?, 6 TH. & RES. IN ED. 267,
268 (2008) (collecting examples of school admissions lotteries).
46. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e)(2) (2006) (regarding allocation of certain excess visas to "diver-
sity immigrants").
47. See infra text accompanying note 88 (discussing the 1969 military draft lottery).
48. Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES 18, 31-50 (1978)
(investigating quantity and allocation decisions, and comparing markets, political processes,
custom, and "lotteries" defined to include both equal chances and equal payouts); EISTER,
SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 69-78 (comparing lotteries to absolute equality,
queuing, rotation, need, productivity, contribution, desert, and auctions).
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In so doing, it should be understood that randomization is fully
compatible with modernist rationality. Twentieth-century modern-
ists made room for randomization by better specifying the concept,
incorporating it into theories of rational choice, and harnessing it to
make experiments more reliable. Randomization need not involve
a belief in divine will revealed by lot,49 nor does it bypass the issue
of how to make contested decisions. Randomization is one decision
strategy among many,5° and although there might not be an
uncontested boundary to its optimal domain, there is an emerging
group of rational justifications for resort to lots.
1. Equal Opportunity and Other Features
As a decision rule, randomization has one particularly special
feature: it represents a certain version of equal opportunity."'
Statistically random processes guarantee an equal chance of
yielding any outcome within a predetermined outcome set. The
connection to equal opportunity is probably most apparent when the
possible outcomes are associated with individual persons, as with a
lottery for a benefit in which each pool member receives one ticket.
This is only one version of equal opportunity, however, and not
necessarily the most compelling. Other versions bracket a limited
number of characteristics, such as race or sex, while allowing pool
members to compete on other grounds. Statistical randomization is
different. It aims to equalize chances across the board and prevents
distinctions based on skills, endowments, desire, or anything else.
In addition, only chances are equalized, not necessarily outcomes.
Giving each of 100 pool members a 1 percent chance of receiving a
benefit is obviously not the same as giving each of them 1 percent
of the benefit. Statistical randomization thus makes outcomes less
49. See, e.g., Joshua 7:11-22 (King James) (involving the identification of Achan the thief);
Proverbs 16:33 ("The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing thereof is of the LORD.").
50. For a distinct claim that dedication to critical reason mandates randomization in
situations of uncertainty involving human behavior and punishment policy, see Bernard E.
Harcourt, Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment: On the Limits of Reason and the Virtues
of Randomization, 40 Soc. RES. 307, 328-34 (2007).
51. See, e.g., BARBARA GOODWIN, JUSTICE BY LOTTERY 39-40 (1992) (stressing an
equalization role for lotteries); Hank Greely, Comment, The Equality of Allocation by Lot, 12
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 113, 122, 141 (1977) (similar).
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predictable than equal shares, and it is therefore not only a pro-
found leveler of individual difference but also a source of unsettling
drama. The next section describes occasions when granting equal
chances is nevertheless desirable. For now, it is enough to recognize
this feature as a source of difference for randomization.
Randomization has other notable features, but they turn out to be
less unique. Theorists tend to stress that randomization can (1) cut
decision costs,52 (2) tie the hands of decision makers,5" and (3)
dampen behavioral incentives all around, if compared to decisions
based on merit, willingness to pay, and so forth. 4 Lotteries indeed
can be run quickly with modest expenditures-although high costs
can arise from deciding whether to randomize, which outcomes to
randomize, and how to safeguard the randomization process from
corruption. It is also true that honestly conducted lotteries place
results beyond anyone's influence, including error-prone decision
makers, and therefore lotteries might reduce incentives to curry or
solicit favor. But many rules55 share these qualities. Consider "equal
shares for everyone" and "oldest people win."5" These, too, are easily
administered flat rules that leave little room for personal influence
when honestly executed. Because randomization is a semi-exotic
practice in official decisions, perhaps it is easy to forget that it is
simply one of many possible rules.5" That said, randomization does
have a peculiar relationship to uncertainty. Inflexible rules tend
to be allied with predictability and planning, even if they do not
always match up in practice. Lotteries are distinct. Statistical
52. See DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 54.
53. See CALABRESI & BOBBI7T, supra note 48, at 44; DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 51-53.
54. See DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 56; EISTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12,
at 109-13. The comparative baseline of merits decisions might be implicit in these writings,
which make the point about dampening incentives. But it should be stressed that
randomization can instead preserve incentives, at least for lottery pool members, when
compared to a different baseline. See infra text accompanying note 72.
55. See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (distinguishing specific rules from flexible
standards); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
559-63, 586-96 (1992) (adding the dimension of complexity/simplicity).
56. Not all of these alternative rules can be described as orthogonally random. Some of
them will aim to approximate normatively defensible grounds for decision.
57. See, e.g., John Broome, Selecting People Randomly, 95 ETHICS 38, 41-42 (1984)
(recognizing decision cost considerations in favor of lotteries, but rightly noting cheap
alternatives).
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randomization assures that no potential outcome is more likely than
any other, meaning that observers can, at best, plan for equal
chances. Whether imperfect predictability is undesirable depends on
the needs of decision makers. Either way, it helps set randomization
apart. Thus randomization's distinctiveness does not come from its
rule-like character, but rather from a combination of features that
starts where we began: a principle of equal opportunity, joined with
a hard-line rule of decision and a notable degree of unpredictability.
2. Overlapping Justifications
Although randomization has been around for many centuries,
there seems to be no precise and concise restatement of when it is
normatively superior to alternative decision strategies. This might
be the consequence of its relatively rare use in significant social
decisions, or it could be that an easily executed restatement is not
possible. Ultimately, the superiority of randomization depends on
a normative orientation and factual premises over which people will
disagree, along with a contestable review of the feasible alterna-
tives. Instead of fabricating a universal prescription, we can gather
arguments that are appealing from several perspectives.
Two reasons for randomizing will nonetheless be set aside:
divination and aesthetics. This is not to downplay the influence of
either; they have motivated randomization for an impressively
long time. But divination is foreclosed under the type of modernist
rationality by which this Article intends to abide. It might be
possible for a modernist to recommend randomization because
others will believe the outcomes reveal divine will, but not because
she believes this to be true. The reason for bracketing aesthetics is
different. There is nothing nonrational about choosing randomiza-
tion because it produces drama and mystery, or because it feels
appropriately humble in challenging decision situations. Yet such
intuitions can be reinforced with arguments that do not depend on
a particular aesthetic sensibility or thrill-seeking decision makers.
Three overlapping justifications for randomization then stand out.
The first involves equally strong claims to some outcome. Claims
might seem equally strong because of an egalitarian commitment or
because of irreducible uncertainty. Either way, randomization be-
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comes plausible at least if the resource in question is indivisible. A
second justification is less connected to any particular normative
vision and is more of a pragmatic concession to brute fact. It invokes
lotteries as the least-bad option when behavior might otherwise
be socially destructive. A third justification is informational or
experimental. Random sampling and random interventions offer the
possibility of eliminating uncertainty for the future. These argu-
ments are sometimes set apart from others,5" but the popularity of
natural experiments today makes any such division artificial.
a. Equal Claims and Indivisibility
Because randomization represents a form of equal opportunity,
it can be a logical response from decision makers confronted with
equally plausible courses of action.59 More than one factor influences
whether a decision maker views a set of choices as equally justified.
Among them is a commitment to some version of egalitarian justice
that aims to afford people equal dignity and respect. Even with full
information, egalitarians can be attracted to randomization as a
method for providing people respect in the form of equal chances to
enjoy a benefit or to avoid a burden.6 ° Barbara Goodwin pushes far
in this direction. She considers a "Total Social Lottery" to better mix
life chances when scarcity and structured inequality thwart that
goal.6' We can conclude that the proper domain for differentiating
merits judgments is much larger, and the domain for randomization
far smaller, without overlooking the latter's equalizing potential.
58. Duxbury and Elster do mention randomized trials in discussing the control of decision-
maker bias, but it is not a theme for either of them. See DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 100-02;
ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 53-54; cf. Yair Listokin, Learning
Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 552-53 (2008) (examining briefly the option of
randomized policy intervention in an extended argument for policy variation when decisions
are reversible).
59. For a sophisticated contractarian defense of the lottery as an impartial method of
distribution when competing claims are equally strong, see Peter Stone, Why Lotteries Are
Just, 15 J. POL. PHIL. 276 (2007).
60. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 285-89, 298
(1980); Greely, supra note 51, at 141. To reiterate, an egalitarian randomizer still must choose
the pool of outcomes using indications of merit, need, and so on.
61. See GOODWIN, supra note 51, at 101-03.
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Such moderation helps explain limited lotteries for housing vouch-
ers and charter school slots, but not for ordinary hiring decisions.
If equality across some chosen set of people is ever a commitment,
why prefer merely equal chances to actually equal shares? Lotteries
offer only the former along with uncertainty in the interim. It turns
out, however, that randomization is uniquely suited to the goal of
equalization for a class of decision situations. These situations
involve indivisibility, by which I mean that an item slated for
allocation cannot be literally divided or cannot be divided without
an intolerable loss of value." Randomization allows each pool
member to obtain an equal chance of receiving a benefit even if the
benefit cannot be partitioned. Unwanted burdens can be viewed as
the flipside of scarce benefits, and randomization likewise spreads
burdens without forcing each pool member to suffer.
A classic illustration is the overcrowded lifeboat. If more space
cannot be constructed and passengers cannot share the existing
space without jeopardizing the well-being of everyone, the passen-
gers might justly draw lots to allocate limited seating. 3 Although
passengers might use deliberation to ensure that some stay aboard,
such as navigators who can increase everyone's probability of
survival, they might allocate the remaining space by lot so that
"those having equal rights [are] put upon an equal footing."' There
are other possibilities, but few will suggest auctioning off the space.
The analysis for subsidized housing and public education is not
much different for the egalitarian.
Another perspective from which to see equally strong claims
requires no such background commitment to treating people equal-
62. See JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS: EQUALITY, UNCERTAINTY AND TIME 196 (1991)
(characterizing lotteries as providing "surrogate satisfaction" for equal claims to scarce
indivisible goods); ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 69-70. Scarcity
indicates an allocation problem rather than a solution to it, so it is not a helpful foundation
for promoting randomization over other decision strategies.
63. See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW: AVICTORIAN YACHTING
TRAGEDY 166-76 (1984) (describing suggestions that lots be drawn to select persons to be
thrown overboard).
64. United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383)
(instructing a jury that drawing lots "or some like way" guarantees equal rights and "guard[s]
against partiality and oppression, violence and conflict"). A different view is EDMOND CAHN,
THE MORAL DECISION: RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN LAw 71 (1956), calling
for group death in the absence of an individual sacrifice by free will.
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ly. It follows from twentieth-century theories of instrumentally
rational choice. This might seem counterintuitive insofar as
randomization has been associated with mindlessness or frivolity.
But rational choice theorists understand randomization's power to
enhance one player's strategic position with respect to another65
and, more generally, to respond cheaply to situations of indifference
and uncertainty. 6 "In the absence of reasons for choosing one
alternative ... rather than another," Jon Elster writes, "we might as
well select one at random."67 This sense can arise naturally for
theorists who still believe that "[rjationalism sees its chief triumph
in the clear recognition of the limits of actual insight." 8
More specifically, prescriptive theories for rational decisions can
run out before they identify a uniquely superior choice. One problem
is decision-maker indifference, even given perfect information. Real
cases of perfect equipoise might be rare, but lack of relevant
information is not. Key information can be too costly to be worth
acquiring or impossible to obtain, thereby inhibiting the prediction
of payoffs or the estimation of probabilities. In addition, a decision
maker might be unable to rank his feasible options when they differ
along sufficiently different dimensions. Finally, the correct norma-
tive goal for decision might be unsettled. Without knowing the
appropriate objective, instrumental rationality cannot function.
Now, sometimes these decision situations can be avoided and
sometimes alternatives to randomization will seem at least equally
attractive. But if a decision is unavoidable, and particularly in cases
65. See Eric Talley, Interdisciplinary Gap Filling: Game Theory and the Law, 22 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 1055, 1058, 1059 n.6 (1997) (reviewing DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY
AND THE LAW (1994)) (describing randomization strategies as one equilibrium in a
noncooperative coordination game).
66. See Heyd, supra note 28, at 62, 66.
67. ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 38, 54, 73, 75, 107-09 (noting the
potentially prohibitive costs of "fine-tuned ... screening); see also DUXBURY, supra note 8, at
70-71 (noting the issue of information overload); Edna UIlmann-Margalit & Sidney
Morgenbesser, Picking and Choosing, 44 Soc. RES. 757, 758-65, 773-74 (1977) (analyzing
"picking" as opposed to "choosing" based on preferences and reasons).
68. Otto Neurath, The Lost Wanderers of Descartes and the Auxiliary Motive, in OTro
NEURATH, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: 1913-1946, at 1, 8 (Robert S. Cohen & Marie Neurath
trans., eds., 1983); see Harcourt, supra note 50, at 316 (claiming that modernists nevertheless
continue to take leaps of faith); see also ELSFER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at
122.
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of indivisibility, statistical randomization gains ground when sound
reasons for choosing run short.
b. Pragmatism and Incentives
This brings us to the incentive effects of randomization and
pragmatic attempts to account for them. Although pragmatism
needs a normative direction, this justification does not depend on a
special value for human equality, nor does it run on uncertainty.
Pragmatism aims to use a sophisticated understanding of human
behavior in light of identifiable incentives for the purpose of optimal
legal design.69 The resulting lessons might suggest randomization
in several different ways and settings. In fact, there is no simple
description of the incentive effects of randomization; even when
human behavior is predictable, the perceived effect of randomization
depends on the point of comparison.
Consider the common claim that randomization eliminates
behavioral incentives and, as such, is a tool for fighting corruption.7"
One might expect people to act in socially destructive ways in the
absence of special care and then find comfort in the rule-like
character of a lottery. A guarantee of equal probabilities ties the
hands of error-prone decision makers while apparently cutting
incentives of potential beneficiaries to curry favor with them, all
with the bonus of low decision costs once the rule is in place.71
However much we might like decision makers to reward skill or
effort, we may lack confidence that the system can do so adequately
at a tolerable cost. From the baseline of merit allocation, therefore,
instituting randomization seems to eliminate incentives.
69. See, e.g., ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 1-122 (making the
attempt from a rational choice perspective); see also GOODWIN, supra note 51, at 45-46
(similar, from an egalitarian perspective).
70. See GOODWIN, supra note 51, at 45.
71. See DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 51-56. Note, however, that a dysfunctional decision
environment may undermine confidence that randomization can be honestly performed. This
is one way in which the case for lotteries can rest on self-defeating assumptions. For a random
case assignment system that was apparently corrupted by a bribe-taking court official, see
DAVID C. STEELMAN & JAMES R. JAMES, ASSURING RANDOMNESS AND SECURITY IN THE
INDIVIDUAL-CALENDAR ASSIGNMENT OF CASES TO JUDGES IN THE CUYAHOGA COUNTY (OH)
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 1-2,6 (1988) (National Center for State Courts Technical Assistance
Report) (recognizing that "any system for random case assignment can be subverted").
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But randomization can instead preserve incentives among pool
members when compared to a different baseline. Randomization can
be used as part of a strategy to cheaply influence large groups.
Decision makers might eschew pervasive monitoring, randomly
sample from the target population, and increase the penalty for
noncompliance relative to a regime with 100 percent detection. 2
This kind of logic explains the value of random sampling for
auditing in various settings.7" In addition, randomization can en-
courage decisive action by softening decision-maker responsibility
for particular outcomes.7 4 One can imagine lifeboat passengers
feeling like murderers if they vote on whom to cast overboard, and
feeling like fair people making the best of a tragic situation if they
draw lots.75 It also has been argued that randomization occasionally
prompts amicable settlements. Granting entitlements to equal prob-
abilities can facilitate efficient bargaining by hoisting a veil of
ignorance, thereby minimizing the significance of private valuation
information and strategic behavior.76 Thus, randomization can
reduce incentives for action (compared to merits judgments) or
72. Cf. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 177-81 (1968) (attempting to model such trade-offs). Getting the penalty right depends
on, among other factors, the degree of risk aversion expected in the monitored class, see
generally Harcourt, supra note 50, at 336-37 (discussing sentencing lotteries), and whether
the risk of penalty increases with the amount of regulated conduct, see Richard Craswell &
John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280-83,
298-99 (1986) (analyzing the effect of legal uncertainty on overcompliance, undercompliance,
and the optimal penalty multiplier).
73. See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 923 (2006) (regarding random inspection of containers at ports).
On the possibilities of auditing government agencies as well, see Mariano-Florentino Cuilar,
Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227 (2006). It is worth noting that a
greater spread of potential sacrifice can have political effects congenial to egalitarian projects.
With shared risks come shared interests and the possibility of an engaged class of citizens
who demand policies that serve the broad public interest. See DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 56-
57; GOODWIN, supra note 51, at 95-96. But such large-pool lotteries must be constructed in the
first place. Implementing risk expansions to engineer a different political environment is
impossible if successful implementation requires the political environment meant to be
created by the expansion.
74. See GOODWIN, supra note 51, at 97-99.
75. Accord id. (asserting relief from responsibility as a benefit of lotteries).
76. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1034-36, 1073-77 (1995) (arguing that
ownership ambiguity can dampen incentives to over- or understate private valuation, though
emphasizing that other transaction costs might be more important).
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increase them (compared to incomplete enforcement, handwringing,
or game-playing).
c. Information and Experimentation
Finally, randomization is a foundation for learning and experi-
mentation. It provides a way to convert difficult choices into
intermediate steps. As the modern analogue to divination, today's
best empirical studies on causation often rely on random assign-
ments to treatment and control groups.77 Random assignment across
a sufficient number of cases should equalize unaccounted for
variables,78 which helps explain its promotion by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration for use in clinical drug trials.79 This experi-
mental function holds even when lotteries are chosen for other
reasons. For example, the Vietnam draft lottery was not chosen
because of what researchers might learn about the effects of mil-
itary service on later life, but it did offer up a natural experiment.8'
Similarly, randomization can be used intentionally to draw rep-
resentative samples from a population of interest."' The samples can
be studied at lower cost than can the entire population. Many
government agencies use sampling for this informational purpose,
starting with a measurement of the nation's monthly unemployment
rate in 1939.82 Whether by policy intervention or survey sampling,
77. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2008) (noting that a characteristic of adequate and well-
controlled clinical studies is assignment by randomization).
78. See, e.g., Gary Burtless, The Case for Randomized Field Trials in Economic and Policy
Research, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 63, 66-67 (offering a brief restatement); Donald T.
Campbell, Legal Reforms as Experiments, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 217, 217-18 (1970) (offering a
classic endorsement); see also Ann Oakley, A Historical Perspective on the Use of Randomized
Trials in Social Science Settings, 46 CRIME & DELINQ. 315, 316-25 (2000) (offering a brief
history). It appears that the first uses of randomization in experiments did not occur until the
late nineteenth century. See Ian Hacking, Telepathy: Origins of Randomization in
Experimental Design, 79 ISIS 427, 431-34, 438-40, 447-49 (1988) (discussing use of
randomizers to test telepathic abilities). Experimental trials are much older, in agriculture
for example, but randomization does not seem to be part of that history. See id. at 430-31.
79. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(a), (b)(2)(i)-(iv), (b)(4) (2008).
80. See Joshua D. Angrist, Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence
from Social Security Administrative Records, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 313, 313-14 (1990).
81. See Martin R. Frankel & Lester R. Frankel, Fifty Years of Survey Sampling in the
United States, PUB. OPINION Q., Winter 1987, at S127, S128.
82. See id.; see also JOSEPH W. DUNCAN & WILLIAM C. SHELTON, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
REVOLUTION IN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STATISTICS 1926-1976, at 50 (1978); Sarah B.
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randomization can serve the function of information collection in the
hope of improving future decisions.
Of course, randomized decision making has serious drawbacks.8"
Statistical randomization is a freakishly effective leveler that
cannot distinguish the good, the bad, and the ugly. It might reduce
incentives not only to appear needful but also to actually become
meritorious. Randomization may undermine constructive planning
as well, and it will not provide reasons for particular outcomes. One
can argue with a decision maker's decision to randomize but not
with a randomization device's output. This can be distressing.
Furthermore, the semi-mindlessness of randomization separates
individual decision makers from particular outcomes. People still
bear responsibility for deciding to randomize, yet randomization
interferes with a regime of accountability and associated effort. In
addition, randomization's nifty slicing power in situations of indi-
visibility might be distracting. We should not neglect the possibility
that scarcity can be ameliorated at tolerable cost, just as we should
remember that randomization requires normative judgments about
what to randomize.8 4 Indeed, preserving large domains for merits
and markets can prevent scarcity in the first place.
Randomization's flight from individualized merits judgments
and decision-maker responsibility suggests that often it will be
undesirable. But randomization should be most attractive when
competing claims to an indivisible good appear equally strong, when
people will behave in socially destructive ways under an alternative
decision rule, and when randomizing is likely to yield insights for
future decision making.
3. Three Examples in Government
Although restating the proper domain for randomization in
decision making is challenging, it is more than a parlor game. Even
government decision making has a modest tradition of deliberate
Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 CONN. L. REV. 161, 166-68
(2008) (stating that randomized tax audits are essential information gathering tools).
83. See, e.g., GOODWIN, supra note 51, at 46-47 (listing objections to lotteries).
84. Accord Carol Necole Brown, Casting Lots: The Illusion of Justice and Accountability
in Property Allocation, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 65, 73 (2005).
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randomness. In the United States, official randomization dates back
to the organization of government in 1789.85 Allocation of the first
Senators to three different election classes was done, in part, by
lot.
86
Among the best known contemporary instances is the military
draft for the Vietnam War. The decision to compel people to serve
comes with the issue of whom to compel. One option is to rely on
officials to choose conscripts based on fitness. The Vietnam draft
relied in part on this model, but there was room for abuse, with
different draft boards using different tests and affording preferen-
tial treatment among equally fit conscripts.87 In 1969, the President
ordered the next round of conscripts to be chosen randomly from a
pool of nineteen to twenty-five year olds."8 Of course, discretion and
gaming were not eliminated, and many thought the war was
misguided in the first place. Yet randomization becomes palatable
when a national obligation requires resources from many, but not
all people, each of whom are presumptively equally entitled to avoid
service. If the government could acquire reliable information at no
cost, it might conscript only the fittest people with the lowest
opportunity costs, but a crudely defined lottery pool might be the
best first step. 9
A second example comes from the same era, but it was a conscious
effort to experiment. By the 1960s, some welfare-state reformers
were pushing a negative income tax, with reduced benefits as in-
come from other sources increased.9" One debatable concern was
that a guarantee would reduce work incentives to an unacceptably
low level.91 In response, large-scale randomized trials costing hun-
85. See Adam M. Samaha, Originalism's Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295,1357
(2008).
86. See id. at 1357-58 (noting the combination of deliberation with chance).
87. See GEORGE Q. FLYNN, THE DRAFr 1940-1973, at 169-70, 172-73, 180, 231 (1993).
88. See Exec. Order No. 11,497, 34 Fed. Reg. 19,019 (Nov. 26, 1969); FLYNN, supra note
87, at 224-58 (discussing the political back story).
89. See, e.g., Harvard Study Group, On the Draft, 9 PUB. INT. 93, 95 (1967) (supporting a
lottery for the Vietnam draft and opposing student deferments).
90. See Robert A. Moffitt, The Negative Income Tax and the Evolution of U.S. Welfare
Policy, J. EcON. PERSP., Summer 2003, at 119,120 [hereinafter Moffitt, Negative Income Tax].
91. See Robert A. Moffitt, The Role of Randomized Field Trials in Social Science Research:
A Perspective From Evaluations of Reforms of Social Welfare Programs, 47 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 506, 509 (2004) [hereinafter Moffitt, Role of Randomized Field Trials].
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dreds of millions of dollars were run to test certain effects of the
idea.92 Random samples of households receiving support from Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) were either kept within
the existing system or given various levels of guaranteed income.93
Although the experiments have been criticized,94 they were an effort
at informed policymaking with intriguing results. The experiments
suggested to some observers that the labor supply effect was not
dramatic across different benefit-reduction rates, though beneficia-
ries did participate in the labor market less than those who received
no welfare assistance.95 We can debate the propriety of experiment-
ing on (only) low-income people," but we can also sympathize with
random policy intervention to acquire knowledge.
A third example shows randomization in an arguably less
flattering light. From 1960 until 1987, the federal government used
lotteries to distribute oil and gas leases for certain government-
owned lands.97 Leases for lands with known resource potential were
supposed to be auctioned while other never-leased land was given
first-in-time to qualified applicants and the remainder was distrib-
uted by lottery to applicants who paid a nominal fee.98 It is difficult
to see why auctions were not the better solution, even if large
amounts of government land would remain unleased. A lottery will
not reward knowledge about drilling prospects and it awards leases
regardless of applicant need or ability. Those who applied for leases
92. See WILLIAM M. EPSTEIN, WELFARE INAMERICA: How SOCIAL SCIENCE FAILS THE POOR
90-91 (1997); Moffitt, Negative Income Tax, supra note 90, at 120.
93. See Moffitt, Role of Randomized Field Trials, supra note 91, at 509-10.
94. See Gary Burtless, The Work Response to a Guaranteed Income: A Survey of
Experimental Evidence, in LESSONS FROM THE INCOME MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENTS 22-25
(Alicia H. Munnell ed., 1987) (reviewing the debate).
95. See Moffitt, Role of Randomized Field Trials, supra note 91, at 509.
96. See David Greenberg, Mark Shroder & Matthew Onstott, The Social Experiment
Market, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1999, at 157, 159, 162 (finding that, when the government
uses randomized trials, it tends to test proposals aimed at the disadvantaged rather than
existing programs or proposals aimed at other groups).
97. See Thomas L. Sansonetti & William R. Murray, A Primer on the Federal Onshore Oil
and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987 and Its Regulations, 25 LAND & WATER L. REv. 375, 380-
82 (1990).
98. See id. at 380-81. Apparently, high potential land had sometimes fallen into a first-in-
time category, which led to "mob scenes." CARL J. MAYER & GEORGE A. RILEY, PUBLIC DOMAIN,
PRIVATE DOMINION: A HISTORY OF PUBLIC MINERAL POLICY IN AMERICA 198 (1985) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Later, approximately 97 percent of all leases were
allocated by lottery. See id. at 318.
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were often unable to exploit any resources present; those who were
had to track down the leaseholder and negotiate.99 This might be a
small transaction cost, but an auction skips that step and the
government would remain free to distribute the proceeds to the
disadvantaged or to anyone else."10
II. RANDOMIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY
We have seen that randomization is normatively plausible in
certain decision situations and unacceptable in others. Given a
sufficient number of decisions, randomization ought to comprise a
nontrivial fraction of decision rules selected, assuming that decision
makers are rational. With hundreds of thousands of disputes ad-
judicated in the administrative state and in various judiciaries
every year, one might guess that coin flipping would become
standard in a number of close merits questions. But it has not. In
fact, government decision making is rarely randomized, and nearly
never for the purpose of adjudicating merits issues. Yet when push
comes to shove, judges have not seriously resisted randomization
either. Sometimes judges actually encourage it.' °' This Part at-
tempts to sort out the judicial position on randomization.
A. Judicial Self-Regulation
1. Sanctions and General Opposition
For judges, flipping coins is an easy way to draw misconduct
sanctions. It is a basis for penalties well beyond mere reversal by an
appellate court. Every decade or so, a judge overtly randomizes a
merits decision and the reaction from those who punish judicial
misconduct is uniformly negative." 2
99. See MAYER & RILEY, supra note 98, at 198 (noting that many lease winners sold their
leases to oil and gas companies).
100. The best defense of this lottery probably involves incentives and politics. Perhaps
officials could not be trusted to appropriately allocate the proceeds from an auction and, with
the risk of untapped land remaining in government hands, a lottery for applicants was a
convenient compromise to achieve a measure of useful privatization.
101. See infra notes 161-95 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., In re Daniels, 340 So. 2d 301, 302, 307 (La. 1976); Judicial Inquiry and
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Much of this aversion involves public relations. Arbiters of
judicial discipline are convinced that citizens will not tolerate merits
randomization. "A court of law is not a game of chance," as one
misconduct commission put it. 0 3 'The public has every right to
expect that a jurist will carefully weigh the matters at issue and, in
good faith, render reasoned rulings and decisions.""1 4 On a public
relations theory, moreover, it makes sense to sanction a judge for
simply appearing to randomize merits issues even if the judge
actually decides the case on other grounds. This has, in fact, been
done.105
Perhaps any judicial tolerance for randomization in adjudication
is incompatible with survival-level legitimacy for the court system.
A public with little information about judicial performance might
see coin flips as a sign that judges are not taking their jobs seri-
ously, that law often can do no better than chance, or that judges
enjoy lording the power of chance over hapless litigants.' In
addition, banning merits randomization could bolster an image of
courts as unique systems of reason set apart from other public
offices, and from arbitration. Instead of metaphorically splitting
babies, courts might fashion themselves as institutions that not only
offer decisive resolution of contested issues upon request, but that
provide rational explanations for every significant decision they
make.
In fact, judges can be sanctioned for randomization even if they
first make efforts to decide a contested issue on other grounds and
even if they show respect for the difficulties of judgment. Consider
the disciplinary proceedings against Judge Helen Brown, a family
Review Comm'n of Va. v. Shull, 651 S.E.2d 648, 650, 652, 658 (Va. 2007).
103. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT 84, 88
(1984) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT] (In re Friess).
104. Id.; see Coons, supra note 8, at 110 ("People resist having their noses rubbed in the
randomness of the system."); see also Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV.
603, 610-11 (1985) (similar).
105. See Daniels, 340 So. 2d at 307 (sanctioning a trial judge who appeared to decide guilt
by coin flip, regardless of the actual basis for decision).
106. See, e.g., Shull, 651 S.E.2d at 658 (concluding that "tossing a coin in a courtroom to
decide a legal issue pending before the court .... denigrated the litigants whose case he decided
and subjected our justice system to ridicule"); ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 103, at 86-87
(barring a judge from office for using a coin toss to decide whether to sentence a defendant to
twenty days in jail rather than thirty days, which assertedly "undermined public respect for
the judiciary").
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court judge in Michigan."°7 In a divorce case, she had temporarily
placed two children with their maternal grandparents; later, the
biological father renewed his demand for custody.1 8 While that
issue was pending, the father and the grandparents argued over
where the children should spend Christmas Eve as opposed to
Christmas Day.0 9 Despite Judge Brown's encouragement, the
parties could not resolve this relatively minor dispute on their
own."0 With each side's arguments "equally compelling,""' the
judge ordered the question resolved by a coin flip, and the father
was awarded custody for Christmas Eve." 2
Judge Brown was censured," 3 but as a matter of decision theory
and the disciplinary record, her resort to randomization seems
perfectly rational. As far as we can tell, she faced two options that
were equally supported on the available information. She was not
charged with sloth or misunderstanding the arguments."' And she
faced a choice that other judges might have decided on questionable
grounds-for example, by a tiebreaking preference for older couples
over fathers, or vice versa. Publicly flipping a coin to resolve this
merits issue was nevertheless intolerable to the state's high court,
and threatening enough to warrant discipline rather than mere
reversal and remand."5 In this way, Elster's hope for randomization
107. See In re Brown, 662 N.W.2d 733, 734 (Mich. 2003).
108. See id. at 736.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Id. (quoting the adopted findings of the Judicial Tenure Commission).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 733.
114. See id. at 737.
115. Judge Brown's coin flip did attract local media attention. See David Ashenfelter, Judge
Uses Coin Flip to Decide Custody, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 8, 2002 (reporting that a chief
judge in the county indicated that the coin flip showed a lack of seriousness); see also Brown,
662 N.W.2d at 737 (Weaver, J., concurring) ('The press coverage surrounding the misconduct
greatly increased both the public's knowledge of the incident and, consequently, the public's
trust and confidence in the judiciary was damaged."); id. at 742 (reporting a Commission
conclusion that Judge Brown had "denigrated the judicial process and legal system"). It
should be noted that Brown faced a second misconduct charge, see id. at 734 (regarding
involvement with a charitable organization), which might or might not make her
randomization look worse.
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in certain custody disputes116 fell to Neurath's feared "reproach of
frivolity or cynicism.""' 7
Judicial opposition to randomization extends further. It reaches
statistical sampling of contested cases, even when doing so could
save substantial decision costs. 18 Lower federal courts seem
unwilling to randomly sample from a plaintiff class to resolve
similar issues for all plaintiffs. 19 This is true despite the possibility
that collateral estoppel will have a similar effect. In fact, lower
courts are open to early scheduling of randomly selected bellwether
trials with the expectation that similar cases will thereafter settle
accordingly or be subject to preclusion."o The resort to rough
substitutes for outright resolution by random sampling reinforces
a sense of judicial aversion to randomizing merits questions. Parties
are entitled to believe that their situations are special, or will
otherwise be advantaged by additional process, and seek a more
personalized trial. 2 ' Yet judicial willingness to expedite bellwether
trials means that, practically speaking, a deliberate lottery will
influence outcomes.
The best-known judicial statements on individualized case as-
sessment in opposition to randomization are found in the Eighth
116. See ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 163-74 (defending
randomization in some cases of real uncertainty as to the best parent where children will
likely be hurt by delay).
117. Neurath, supra note 68, at 8-9 (discussing the prospect of officials drawing lots).
118. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545, 546
(1998) (advocating "randomly sampling damages without apology").
119. See McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215,219-20 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying class
certification), rev'g Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1022 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (approving sampling to prove plaintiff class reliance on "light" cigarette messages);
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 319-21 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting, under state
law and the Seventh Amendment, adjudication of all class damages claims based on a random
sample of claims). But see Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 783-87 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir.
1996) (upholding, against a due process objection, the use of a random sample to determine
the fraction of valid claims for purposes of recovery from a common pool). For a claim that the
trend is toward adjudication by sampling in mass tort, see Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Sampling Evidence at the Crossroads, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 969, 970 (2007).
120. See, e.g., In re Medtronic, Inc. Implantable Defibrillator Prod. Liab. Litig., No. CIV
05MD1726, 2007 WL 846642, at *3-4 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2007) (ordering bellwether trial
proceedings by random sampling of plaintiffs and a peremptory strike process); MANUAL FOR
COMPLEXLITIGATION (Fourth) §§ 20.132,22.315 (2004) [hereinafter MANUAL] (recommending
random sampling or agreement on typicality for bellwether trials).
121. See MANUAL, supra note 120, § 22.81.
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Amendment field. A coalition of justices in the early 1970s repudi-
ated capital sentencing for inadequately identifying those defen-
dants who were the most appropriate candidates for death sen-
tences.122 The old regime was likened to "a lottery system" executing
"a random few" 2 ' and "a capriciously selected random handful"
more or less "struck by lightning."'24 Part of this criticism seemed to
be about rarity; perhaps a punishment seldom used would have
little influence on behavior. 2 ' But the justices in the majority
emphasized the problem of imperceptible differences between the
defendants selected for execution and those who were spared. This
distribution is an expected feature of randomization, which must
have prompted the analogies to lotteries and lightning strikes.
Later, a new coalition of justices accepted capital sentencing
with additional guidance to decision makers,'26 yet they did not rush
to impose flat rules on the sentencing process. In fact, the Court
invalidated state laws that automatically imposed a death sentence
on anyone convicted of first-degree murder,'27 without suggesting
that flat exemptions from the death penalty were constitutionally
problematic. The emerging case law thereby indicated that the jus-
tices favored rarity over clarity in death sentencing. 2 ' Sentencers
would have to consider the facts of individual cases, including the
personal story of the defendant and his argument for mercy.
Although this injection of open-ended standards risks the capri-
122. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); id. at 249, 253 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
123. Id. at 293, 304-05 (Brennan, J., concurring); see id. at 295 (criticizing unguided jury
discretion); see also id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (finding "no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed").
124. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (criticizing a penalty "so wantonly and so
freakishly imposed," although suggesting race bias as an explanation). Note that the "random"
or apparently purposeless or patternless selection of a victim has been used as an aggravating
circumstance that justifies imposition of a death sentence. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
200.033(9) (2009); Leslie v. Warden, 59 P.3d 440, 445-46 (Nev. 2002).
125. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 293-94, 299-302 (Brennan, J., concurring).
126. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195-206 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.,
joint opinion).
127. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301-05 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ., joint opinion).
128. See id. at 304 (calling for individualized assessments within classes of convicted
defendants); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008) (reiterating that the
death penalty must be reserved for the most serious crimes and the most deserving
perpetrators).
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ciousness feared in the 1970s, it is consistent with an overarching
commitment to individualized adjudication and inconsistent with
the crudeness of flat rules. Randomization is compatible with rarity
in executions; officials could randomly select very few offenders for
death sentences. But statistical randomization is a rule. It cannot
rank defendants on merits or demerits.
A commitment to personalized adjudication should not be taken
too seriously, however. Every adjudication is personalized in the
sense that a decision rule is brought to bear on a particular case.
Nothing changes if the decision rule is flat and broad rather than
flexible and case-sensitive. Second, to the extent that personaliza-
tion means a preference for standards over rules, it will have only
limited force. An unbending rule in favor of standards is naive,'29
not to mention contradictory. For their part, courts regularly
produce rules, trading decision costs for error costs across time.
Consider judicially imposed limits on punitive damages. Recently,
the Court estimated the median ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages in past cases and used that number to set a ceiling for
future maritime cases involving recklessness."' ° In capital sentenc-
ing, the true test of judicial opposition to randomization would be a
trial system that accurately identified a small set of the most
deserving defendants and then randomly selected half of them for
life sentences. This lottery would impose a kind of rule favoring
leniency without necessarily setting off alarms under established
doctrine.' 3 '
That said, statistical randomization is not the type of rule that
judges ordinarily tolerate for their merits decisions. Assuring ad-
verse parties a 50-50 chance of victory happens to conflict with
several conventional commitments in adjudication. A straightfor-
129. Cf. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("Looked at by itself without regard to the necessity behind it the line or point
seems arbitrary.").
130. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2624-27, 2632-34 (2008). I will not
attempt to square this rulemaking with lower court unwillingness to resolve mass tort claims
by sampling.
131. Cf. ANTHONY EVERITT, AUGUSTUS: THE LIFE OF ROME'S FIRST EMPEROR 70 (2006)
(explaining the ancient practice of decimation, which involved execution of 10 percent of a
pool). Contrast the position of the justices who indicated that a purely random clemency
process in the executive branch would violate due process. See infra note 157 and
accompanying text.
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ward conflict occurs with respect to the imposition of proof burdens
attached to particular elements of a claim or defense. Requiring
proof more likely than not on relevant evidence is plainly different
from offering a 50 percent chance of victory regardless. This is true
whether the elements at issue are hard-line rules or vague stan-
dards, and even if litigated cases are more likely to be hard cases.132
When demand for judgment based on evidence relevant to a given
law is strong, the plausibility of randomization fades.
There is one exception to the strong judicial norm against overt
merits randomization in adjudication. In some states, courts may
partition jointly owned land into plots of roughly equal value and
then allocate these plots across owners by lot.133 The owners might
trade their plots after this initial allocation, but courts have
orchestrated lotteries to facilitate land partition."'
Depending on the objectives of property law in this context, a
lottery may fit well with the overlapping justifications for random-
ization presented in Part I. If we generously assume that a physical
partition is justified, then the joint owners face a kind of indivisibil-
ity problem. Sharing plots is off the table and they need a method
for allocating each portion of the land to one owner. Furthermore,
opting into joint ownership might entail at least presumptively
equal claims to any given plot upon partition. This could be the
advertised consequence of choosing this form of ownership (along
with disincentives for personalizing plots). In any event, figuring out
who has the strongest claim to any particular plot will sometimes be
impossible or not worthwhile. A lottery is a low-cost decision rule,
once equally valued plots are identified. Information problems can
also animate unfortunate strategic behavior, which can exacerbate
the information problems. For instance, if judges were asked to allo-
cate parcels according to the highest value user, a low value user
might attempt to appear most deserving in order to obtain a
particular parcel for the purpose of selling it. Finally, permitting
negotiation and transfer of parcels after a lottery will limit its
132. Cf. George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman's
Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 216-19 (1985) (exploring determinants of settlement).
133. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Judicial Partition of Land by Lot or Chance, 32 A.L.R.
4th 909, 910-15 (1984).
134. See Robertson v. Robertson, 484 S.E.2d 831, 835 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
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significance. In this setting, any unsettling drama associated with
randomization is ameliorated by the opportunity of affected parties
to adjust allocations afterward.
The partition exception is not curious because it is especially
difficult to justify, but because it is so isolated. With respect to
judicial decisions on the merits, partition lotteries are the only
arguably consistent use of randomization. Outside of this exception,
judges risk not only reversal but professional sanctions for random-
izing on the merits. It could be that land partition lotteries enjoy
unique staying power based on biblical support.'35 In addition, these
lotteries are sometimes expressly authorized by state statute.
136
Perhaps the endorsement of another political institution helps sus-
tain the practice. But none of this explains the otherwise virulent
judicial resistance to merits randomization in court, a resistance
that comes with costs.
2. Problems with a Randomization Ban
It cannot be that the theoretically optimal number of occasions for
randomization on a merits question, across the millions of cases
annually adjudicated in courts and administrative agencies, is zero.
In a subset of these cases, however small, randomization will be the
theoretically superior option for reasons of practical indivisibility,
equality norms, nagging uncertainty, incentive effects, and/or ex-
perimental value. That we have difficulty identifying this class of
cases with precision is no reason to think it is an empty set. A strict
prohibition on randomization, moreover, is likely to have problem-
atic side effects.
The first worry is that adjudicators will manufacture false
certainty.137 This can happen in at least three ways. Adjudicators
135. See Numbers 26:52-56 (King James) (relating God's instructions to Moses regarding
land allocation across tribes).
136. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-6-48 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1216 (2009); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 668-7(4) (2008).
137. Cf. Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of Judge: Restraint and
Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 270 (1961) (indicating that judges
might acquire false confidence in their judgments and be less on guard against "bias and
prejudice" if they unrealistically believe in the power of their "objective" analysis to close all
cases).
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might convince themselves that they have ascertained the relevant
norms, historical information, and predictions with greater confi-
dence than they should rationally possess. Similarly, they might
hold to initial impressions and avoid working too hard on difficult
questions in order to avoid the conclusion of indeterminacy.13 8 Or
they might privately accept the uncertainty but attempt to con-
vince observers that conventional legal argument yields a single
superior outcome. The first reaction is a form of denial, the second
is avoidance, and the third is false advertising. Perhaps these
reactions are defensible on consequentialist grounds, but they
suggest the debatable status of a merits randomization ban.'39
This raises the question of how decision makers deal with
uncertainty that they are willing to accept when randomization is
out of the question. A possibility is that legally prohibited grounds
of decision creep in. If the rules of the game truly result in more
than one possible outcome, 40 the tiebreaker must come from outside
of those rules. One such source is the personal predilections of the
decision maker in the form of impermissible bias, whether con-
sciously recognized or more implicit in form.'4 '
In the alternative, decision makers might generate official tie-
breakers that are worse than randomization. If law and available
information leave uncertainty, adjudicators might simply produce
more rules to eliminate discretion and to avoid flipping coins.
Existing adjudicative systems are littered with such tiebreakers.
Plaintiffs ordinarily are supposed to lose unless they prove liability
by a preponderance of the evidence; if a defendant's liability is a
50-50 proposition, the tie goes to the defendant.' Similarly, lower
138. I thank Mark Kelman for suggesting this point.
139. See DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 114-16 (following PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT
OF REASON 17, 21 (1998)); ELsTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 121 ("Honesty
requires us to recognize the pervasiveness of uncertainty and incommensurability, rather
than deny or avoid it."); Harcourt, supra note 50, at 316, 334 (criticizing repeated leaps of
faith).
140. But cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 279-90(1977) (arguing that there
is a single correct answer, even in hard cases, for each decision maker; but counting a
conclusion that a case is "tied" as a single correct answer).
141. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, The Completeness of Public Reason, 3 POL. PHIL. & ECON.
191, 211-14 (2004) (analyzing randomization as a way to avoid resort to nonpublic reasons).
142. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye, The Error of Equal Error Rates, 1 LAW, PROB. & RISK 3, 6 n.10
(2002) ("[S]ome supplementary argument, such as avoiding transaction costs or a preference
for the status quo, is required to choose between a p > 1/2 rule and a p z 1/2 rule.").
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court judgments are affirmed when the appellate panel is equally
divided.'43 In partial contrast, habeas corpus applicants are
supposed to prevail if the judge is in "equipoise" on whether a
constitutional error at trial was harmless.' On the other hand,
states are free to mandate a death sentence if a jury concludes that
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in "equipoise.'
Relatively general rules of decision have similar tiebreaking
qualities. We might characterize canons of interpretation, presump-
tions of constitutional validity, review restricted to clear error, and
other supplemental decision rules as akin to tiebreakers.1' These
rules are telling. They indicate deep background commitments.
Hence we can view the defendants' edge in civil litigation as a
background preference for private ordering, and the equally divided
affirmance rule as a sign of confidence in the lower courts.'47
This proliferation of nominally nonrandom tiebreakers is not
necessarily tragic, but it is vulnerable to criticism. First is the at-
tack from indeterminacy enthusiasts, who can attempt to show that
every tiebreaking decision rule has a hazy boundary that could call
for the production of yet another tiebreaker.' For instance, a
143. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co., LLC v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168,1168 (2008) (per curiam);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2006) (similar result in the absence of a quorum in the Supreme
Court, except in cases of direct appeal from district courts); Morrison Knudsen Corp. v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1221, 1239 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the appellant
loses when the appendix is incomplete and prevents review).
144. O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995).
145. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 181 (2006).
146. See, e.g., Michael P. Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory
Interpretation: Interpreting Law or Changing Law, 43 WM. & MARYL. REv. 539, 570-74 (2001)
(discussing the use of canons of statutory interpretation as tiebreakers in cases of ambiguity);
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV.
253, 267 (2009) ("When a constitutional question is so close, ... the tie for many reasons should
go to the side of deference to democratic processes.").
147. Rarely will a court overtly split differences as a tiebreaker. Judges opt for more visibly
decisive outcomes, perhaps leaving difference-splitting to the arbitration system. A rare
counterexample is the litigation over ownership of Barry Bonds's record-breaking home run
baseball. The trial judge was uncertain whether one claimant had achieved adequate
possession before being assaulted by a mob, and he granted equal and undivided shares to
that claimant and a second claimant who ended up holding the ball. See Popov v. Hayashi, No.
400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *3, *7-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002) (finding the two claims
to be "of equal quality" and ordering the ball sold). (I thank Lior Strahilevitz for this example.)
However one evaluates judicial aversion to splitting differences, merits randomization is still
possible and it can be used to decisively award victory to one party over others.
148. There is a connection here to the observation that indeterminacy in legal rules cannot
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decision maker must know that the substantive law and relevant
evidence actually yields equipoise or less before awarding victory to
a civil defendant. The boundary of equipoise may be no clearer than
the boundary of preponderance or anything else. If that critique is
not entirely successful, there still may be situations in which
tiebreaking decision rules are in tension or conflict.
In addition, nonrandom tiebreakers must be justified as a
normative matter insofar as they are meant to reflect background
assumptions or preferences for legal institutions. These rules might
be constructed to tie up loose ends at the fringes of adjudication, but
they can be linked to the deepest and broadest issues of legal design.
Consider a prisoner on death row challenging the constitutional
validity of his sentence; his claim is denied by a court of appeals and
affirmed by the Supreme Court on an equally divided vote.149
Whatever is the appropriate method of decision in such situations,
it cannot escape difficult judgments. Given such controversial
choices, it remains hard to believe that randomization is categori-
cally less acceptable as a theoretical matter than all of the tiebreak-
ers currently in operation.
B. Judicial Oversight
Does judicial opposition to randomization extend further than the
courthouse door? If another institution determines that randomiza-
tion is appropriate for its own decisions, will judges intervene?
Answering is difficult, in part because only a small set of past cases
are directly relevant. Nonjudicial officials might not be much more
enthusiastic than judges about lotteries, aside from the revenue-
generating variety. Even if randomization is seldom used, however,
it has been litigated in several different settings. This section
attempts to estimate the level of judicial tolerance for nonjudicial
government lotteries.
always be resolved by resort to legal principle, which can reproduce uncertainty. See H.L.A.
HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSoPHY 6-8, 153-58 (1983).
149. See Tompkins v. Texas, 490 U.S. 754, 754 (1989) (per curiam).
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1. Possibilities for Global Opposition
As an initial matter, perhaps courts may fairly conclude that
randomization in official decision making is usually prohibited by
statute. Scattered statutes do explicitly authorize lotteries,150 and
maybe they are sufficiently unorthodox to be disfavored when courts
read vague statutes. Assuming randomization is a controversial
decision rule, it might be appropriate to lean against conclusions
that favor official lotteries.5 1 Officials will not often suffer public
opinion backlash for rejecting randomization, and pervasive
randomization in decision making would produce dystopia.
Regardless of the proper interpretive presumption, a key question
is whether the judiciary will oppose randomization for other
institutions when nonjudicial officers plainly prefer it. Existing
judicial doctrine does include abstract principles that might be
converted into an opposition to randomization per se; and some of
these principles have been categorized as supreme constitutional
law.
One elaboration of equal protection dictates that 'like" cases must
be treated "alike." '52 This principle is notoriously unhelpful insofar
as it requires additional normative content to identify relevant
150. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e)(2) (2006) (regarding excess immigration visas); 20 U.S.C.
§ 7225d(b) (2006) (regarding admission to oversubscribed charter schools receiving federal
grants); 43 U.S.C. § 1353(b)(2) (2006) (regarding government oil sales to help small refiners).
Actually, the search term "random!" appears in the text of over 100 statutory sections in the
U.S. Code, many addressing random sampling. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1614(a) (West 2009)
(regarding audits of lobbyist compliance with disclosure rules); 6 U.S.C. § 923 (2006)
(regarding a plan for random inspection of containers at ports); 42 U.S.C. § 15603(a)(4) (2006)
(regarding a study of prison rape).
151. Cf. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316,338 (1999)
(holding that a federal statute prohibited sampling for congressional apportionment);
Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Intl, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1239 n.3 (11th Cir.
2008) (dictum) (asserting that a contract to be bound by a coin flip could not be enforced under
the Federal Arbitration Act). But cf. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 457 (2002) (holding that
"hot-deck imputation" for missing data was not prohibited "sampling" and was a permissible
method of "actual Enumeration," without judging the constitutional validity of statistical
sampling).
152. See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2153 (2008); Vacco v. Quill,
521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (similar); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940) (similar). I
discuss this notion of equal protection not because it is especially attractive, but because it
survives in judicial materials.
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characteristics for comparison.' 53 From one perspective, however,
this vagueness is unimportant when it comes to randomization.
Equiprobablistic lotteries are designed such that all arguably
relevant differences among pool members are blinkered. As to the
distribution of outcomes, likes will almost certainly end up treated
unalike, no matter what basis is chosen for judging similarity.
Furthermore, unalikes will have been treated alike at the time that
equal chances were distributed, unless everyone in the pool was, in
fact, relevantly alike. Perhaps statistical and orthogonal randomiza-
tion devices unjustifiably omit considerations of merit or need (or
some other metric) from the allocation of chances or outcomes.'
Precisely this disconnect can be restated as a due process prob-
lem. One elaboration of due process resists "arbitrary" decisions.'55
The meaning of this admonition is open to debate. Officials usually
must exercise some discretion to perform their duties, so its absence
cannot be required across the board. But judicial doctrine might
sometimes impose a duty of reasoned decision making or instrumen-
tal rationality.'56 If we focus on the distribution of outcomes,
randomization might violate this principle. As a result of random-
ization, an official will have advantaged pool member A and dis-
advantaged pool member B without any personalized justification
beyond the diktat of an algorithm. This observation does not explain
why the relevant timeframe is after distribution rather than before,
when chances were equalized, but the complaint is clear enough.
153. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 539-56 (1982)
(contending that this version of equality is derivative of substantive-rights arguments); see
also Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1168,
1178 (1983) ("In order to decide what persons are relevantly equal or unequal, substantive
judgments have to be made about what characteristics count."); Kenneth I. Winston, On
Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1974).
154. This puts aside objections based on who or what is excluded from the pool.
155. E.g., Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006).
156. See, e.g., id. at 325, 331 (using "arbitrary" to characterize a rule of evidence, in the
sense of failing to identify a rational relationship between the rule and a legitimate goal); see
also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (rejecting segregation in D.C. public education
as arbitrary in this sense); Thunberg v. Strause, 682 A.2d 295, 299 (Pa. 1996) (defining
"arbitrary" in an attorney misconduct statute partly in terms of randomness). But cf. Skinner
v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1989) (referring to "random or arbitrary"
acts in a discussion of the warrant clause and suggesting concern about unchecked officer
discretion).
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At times, courts have explicitly warned against randomization in
constitutional terms. A good illustration comes from due process
opinions, where judges have used randomization to indicate the
outer boundary of otherwise permissible official discretion. The
leading example is probably Justice O'Connor's discussion of
executive clemency." 7 Although she and her fellow concurring
justices wanted to allow states a variety of procedural options for
deciding when to soften criminal penalties, these justices also
wanted to preserve judicial oversight in exceptional situations.
When might judges intervene? "[A] state official flip[ping] a coin to
determine whether to grant clemency" was one possibility.'58 The
same message about lotteries has been delivered with respect to
local zoning decisions, another field in which today's judges often
display restraint.'59 Such statements intimate that randomization
exhausts judicial tolerance for official discretion in locations where
deference is otherwise likely.
But none of this is enough to establish a judicial policy against
randomization outside the courts. The above-noted elaborations of
equal protection and due process are insufficiently precise to get
much traction on the judicial position. Neither rational choice
theorists nor egalitarians have unqualified objections to lotteries in
social decision making. The propriety of randomization will depend
on factors previously suggested: the indivisibility of the item to be
allocated, the strength of any equality presumption, the degree of
uncertainty, behavioral incentives, the benefits of experimentation,
and the counterarguments for nonrandom distribution at accept-
157. See Oh. Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1998) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (concluding that due process was afforded in this case, however). Justice
O'Connor's concurrence was joined by Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer.
See id. at 288. Justice Stevens dissented. For indication that unfettered official discretion is
easier to defend than randomized clemency, see Grennier v. Frank, 453 F.3d 442,446 (7th Cir.
2006) (illustrating a "wholly arbitrary" decision by reference to a coin flip, but holding that
a discretionary parole system does not provide an entitlement on which to ground due process
claims).
158. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,253-54 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring) (stating that judicial intervention might be warranted if the Senate
"tried" an impeached official by coin flip); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 698 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that a judge could neither blindly rely on a magistrate nor
flip a coin).
159. See Lemke v. Cass County, 846 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring)
(referring to such a decision as "truly irrational" and a violation of substantive due process).
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able decision costs.16 ° Nothing in a judge's offhand disparagement
of randomization forecloses these considerations. If decision
theorists are correct, then a perfectly well constructed decision
process can recommend randomization for a subset of all social
decisions. Within that subset, pool members may be equal in fact or
equal as far as we know, and the advantages of randomization will
outrun the complications.
2. Litigation over Randomization
In fact, the most relevant judicial decisions are permissive. When
courts have examined challenges to deliberate randomization in
nonjudicial official decision making, the challenges have faltered. Of
course, official lotteries may be poorly designed or out of place-the
oil and gas lease lottery program might be an example.'61 But that
is true of government decision making in general. There seems to be
nothing in the scarce randomization case law to indicate a unique
level of judicial skepticism for official lotteries, and occasionally
judges promote randomization.
Only a handful ofjudicial opinions confront the validity of random
allocation schemes, but existing cases show tolerance. For example,
Schenck v. City of Hudson upheld a slow-growth ordinance that
incorporated a lottery.'62 City officials had capped the number of
residential development projects per annum and then used a
stratified lottery to allocate development certificates. 163 The Sixth
Circuit reasoned that randomization would save administrative
costs and prevent uncomfortably subjective decision making.'"
Likewise, a state appellate court upheld random selection among
civil service applicants.'65 Having received more than 2000 valid
applications for only twenty firefighter positions, city officials
decided to randomly select 800 applicants for further competitive
160. See supra Part I.B.2.
161. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
162. 114 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 1997).
163. See id. at 592-93 & n.4 (describing an 80 percent set aside for priority projects such
as lots with preexisting plat approval, affordable housing, and large-lot developments).
164. See id. at 595 (reversing the grant of a preliminary injunction). The scarcity created
by the city's development cap requires independent justification.
165. See Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 363 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
2009]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
testing.' The court found this use of randomization to be a fair
cost-saving device.'67 In a similar spirit, a district court upheld
random selection of ballots as part of a proportional representation
plan.'68 Voters would rank all candidates, their ballots would be
counted according to a random ordering by polling place, and as
soon as any candidate hit a certain threshold of first-choice votes,
second choices would be counted on any subsequent ballots ranking
that candidate first.'69 The order of counting could therefore
influence results, and yet it was a fairly cheap and tamper-resistant
method for a pre-digital age. These cases might show judges fearing
corruption, but they display openness to official randomization
regardless.
Judicial treatment is similar in the few cases examining
randomized policy experiments. The leading case is Aguayo v.
Richardson, which presented a compromise in the welfare benefits
context. v° In one experiment, New York officials could require
training and/or work for certain family members in AFDC house-
holds; but these requirements could be imposed on only a subset of
all social service districts in the state.'' Although the opinion does
not explain precisely how districts were selected for inclusion, the
court of appeals did endorse a "random but rational" criterion
designed to gain information: 'The Equal Protection clause does not
place a state in a vise where its only choices in dealing with the
problems of welfare are to do nothing or plunge into statewide
action."'72 The court did, however, grant a preliminary injunction
against the State's plan to suspend benefits for certain experimental
recipients who did not conform to compliance demands during a
166. See id. at 887.
167. See id. at 889 (finding the procedure reasonable and consistent with the city charter).
Again, to be a sound policy, the scarcity in firefighter positions must be justified. We can
safely assume that Minneapolis did not need to hire hundreds more firefighters.
168. See Campbell v. Bd. of Educ., 310 F. Supp. 94, 102-05 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (denying a
preliminary injunction on equal protection and due process claims).
169. See id. at 98-99.
170. 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973).
171. See id. at 1094-96.
172. Id. at 1109-10; see also id. at 1109 (observing the usefulness of controlled experiments
in medical and social inquiry); Campbell, 310 F. Supp. at 105 ("Chance, if a rational basis
exists for its employment, cannot be said to be an irrational factor.").
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dispute resolution process.173 This ruling softened the State's pre-
ferred experiment, at least until the due process arguments were
developed, while permitting an experiment of some kind.174
It is possible to see judicial resistance to random sampling in
some Fourth Amendment cases, but any opposition is weak.
Depending on the pool subject to search or seizure, statistically
random invasions for law enforcement purposes can trigger adverse
judicial reactions. If officials lack probable cause with respect to
everyone in the pool, then randomized searches are vulnerable to
judicial rebuff in the absence of special circumstances. Random drug
testing cases deliver this message.'
However, the objection here is not to randomization per se. These
cases involve combinations of low ex ante suspicion followed by
random selection; they do not repudiate random sampling when
suspicion is stronger for the entire class. Justice Stevens made this
point in a recent dissent that provoked no objection from the
majority. He asserted that police officers may randomly select which
of numerous speeders to stop and ticket when all cannot feasibly be
stopped.'76 In fact, a theme in Fourth Amendment cases is discom-
fort with discretion among beat officers.177 Once a pool of potential
173. See Aguayo, 473 F.2d at 1095, 1111-12.
174. Lower courts have themselves instituted experimental procedures that affect litigants.
See Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 567, 574-75 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (upholding an
arbitration referral experiment adopted in three federal districts against an equal protection
challenge); HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE COURT 244-45 (2d ed. 1978) (citing an expert
witness experiment); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules, LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67, 79-80 (collecting a few examples of randomized experiments).
175. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826-29 (2002) (upholding random drug
testing for students in extracurricular activities given the "special needs" of public schools);
see also MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 263-65 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding orthogonally
random searches of subway passenger containers to prevent terrorist attacks); United States
v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 614-16, 618 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding random selection of airline
passengers for handheld magnetometer scanning).
176. See Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S.Ct. 2146, 2159-60 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The majority opinion struck an even more permissive note, characterizing such
decisions as inherently discretionary. See id. at 2154.
177. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655-57, 662-63 (1979) (discussing
automobile stops without individualized reasonable suspicion). Compare an officer's
occasional decision to release an apprehended suspect based on a coin flip. See PETER MOSKOS,
COP IN THE HOOD: MYYEARPOICING BALTIMORE's EASTERN DISTRICT 114-15 (2008) (reporting
a Baltimore police officer's practice with respect to loitering).
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targets is chosen, statistical randomization is a way of constraining
official discretion, not enhancing it.' 78
Our case review would be less impressive were it not for instances
of judges reinforcing or encouraging randomization policies. A
striking example is Stodolsky v. Hershey, which dealt with the 1969
military draft lottery. 7 9 The President had ordered "a random
selection sequence for induction."'' " When the lottery dealt the
plaintiffs relatively low draft numbers, they attacked the process as
not truly "random" and claimed that a departure from equal
probabilities violated the President's order and due process
requirements."' They alleged that lottery numbers representing
birthdays were insufficiently mixed together in the urn from which
they were drawn, such that later birthdays (for example, December
31) were more likely to be drawn early than earlier birthdays (for
example, January 1).1"2 In response, a district judge defined
randomness for this situation as equal probability, and concluded
that the President's order required it to be "approached as closely as
reasonably possible under all the circumstances."''
As a normative matter, it is not clear why statistical randomiza-
tion should be preferred to the orthogonal randomness of birthdays
themselves. The selection process might have been morally accept-
able if it picked only December birthdays."M Perhaps the plaintiffs'
objection seemed plausible because statistical randomization really
was what the President had in mind and procedural regularity was
178. For another set of mixed messages, see the doctrine of "random and unauthorized"
deprivations by line officers, which may defeat federal due process claims in favor of state tort
or the Federal Tort Claims Act. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Lipkin
v. SEC, 468 F. Supp. 2d 614, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
179. 2 Selective Serv. L. Rep. 3527, 3528 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
180. Exec. Order No. 11,497, 34 Fed. Reg. 19,019 (Nov. 26, 1969).
181. Stodolsky, 2 Selective Serv. L. Rep. at 3527.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 3528 (denying a motion to dismiss). The court bracketed the due process claim,
noting that it would have "little chance to succeed" if the sequence was "random" within the
meaning of the executive order. Id. at 3527 n.2. For studies finding that the selection process
was probably not statistically random, see Feinberg, supra note 16, at 259-60, and Jorge
Mateu et al., The 1970 US Draft Lottery Revisited: A Spatial Analysis, 53 APPLIED STAT. 219,
220, 229 (2004).
184. Cf. ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 45-46 (claiming epistemic
randomness was adequate).
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especially important to the public. Regardless, the court showed no
antipathy to randomization--quite the opposite.185
In fact, judges occasionally suggest randomization as a solution
to controversial allocation problems. One instance involves pub-
lic housing. The plaintiffs in Holmes v. New York City Housing
Authority8 ' asserted that the City was running a delay-ridden
system with no ascertainable method for allocating scarce slots.18 '
The court of appeals responded that the plaintiffs had stated a
viable due process claim. A system of official discretion was dis-
paraged as "an intolerable invitation to abuse," and, if many
applicants were judged equally qualified under prescribed stan-
dards, the court suggested that "further selections be made in some
reasonable manner such as 'by lot or on the basis of the chronologi-
cal order of application.""8 Likewise, an earlier court of appeals
case proposed randomization for the allocation of scarce liquor
licenses.'89 That court perceived a lottery as superior to official
discretion and the risk of "graft, corruption, and other abuses.' 9 °
Much more recently, the randomization option arose in affirmative
action litigation. Judges opposed to race-based affirmative action in
employment or school admissions episodically point to lotteries as
unproblematic solutions. 9'
185. Accord Freeman v. Schoen, 370 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (D. Minn. 1974) (addressing a due
process objection to departure from random selection for consideration in a parole program).
The Stodolsky court did deny plaintiffs a temporary restraining order. See Stodolsky, 2
Selective Serv. L. Rep. at 3528 (citing widespread reliance on the existing sequence). Later,
a court of appeals concluded that the process was sufficiently "random" in common parlance.
See United States v. Kotrlik, 465 F.2d 976, 977 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (indicating the
drawing was fair, nondiscriminatory, and without deliberate selection of the litigants'
birthdays), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 (1972); see also United States v. Proceeds of Sale of
9,312 Lbs. of Scallops, 738 F. Supp. 598, 601-03 (D. Mass. 1990) (interpreting a regulation
requiring pre-seizure random sampling and refusing to impose scientific standards of
randomness).
186. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
187. See id. at 264.
188. Id. at 265 (citation omitted); see also id. at 265 & n.4 (noting the option of a scoring
system based on each applicant's current housing situation, but warning about the risk of
"arbitrary action").
189. See Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
190. Id. at 609 (condemning uncontrolled official discretion as a due process violation), reh'g
denied, 330 F.2d 55, 56 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (suggesting stricter eligibility standards,
a lottery, or a first-in-time rule for any equally qualified applicants).
191. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1551 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) (addressing
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If we take these suggestions seriously, we are now able to identify
a smattering of situations in which courts permit or encourage
randomization by other officials. It is quite possible for randomiza-
tion to contradict judicial conceptions of supreme law, but those
conceptions do not rule out randomization. Nor is it apparent that
randomization receives especially skeptical treatment. Judges seem
willing to view lotteries in the way that decision theorists do: as an
attractive solution for a class of challenging decision situations.
The last example that I will give is an outlier but it provides a
useful transition. It involves case assignment. The Louisiana
Supreme Court became concerned that prosecutors were effectively
able to choose the judges that they preferred in felony cases. 192 The
calendaring system could be exploited such that the State had an
advantage in the judge-shopping game.193 As a possible remedy, and
as a requirement of state constitutional law, the court recommended
randomized case assignment.9 This is not a trend in constitutional
litigation. Other courts have denied that random assignment is a
matter of litigable constitutional law. 19 A refusal to recognize such
claims indicates that judges are willing to accept some legislative
direction in this field. But whether judges feel entitled to fashion
a case assignment system, many adjudicative institutions behave
consistently with Louisiana's state courts and randomize the
distribution of cases across judges. This requires an explanation,
and a defense.
layoffs of employees tied in seniority and deemed equally qualified, noting prior lotteries, and
quoting Proverbs 18:18 (New American)), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997); Pauline T.
Kim, The Colorblind Lottery, 72 FoRDHAM L. REV. 9, 12-17 (2003) (collecting such arguments).
But cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2004) (stating that a law school could avoid a
lottery in light of risks to both student quality and diversity, and permitting "nuanced
judgment" that takes race into account).
192. See State v. Simpson, 551 So. 2d 1303, 1304 & n.1 (La. 1989) (per curiam).
193. See id. at 1303-04.
194. See id. at 1304 (requiring felony cases to be assigned "on a random or rotating basis
or under some other procedure"); see also Brown & Lee, supra note 8, at 1099-1103
(attempting to marshal arguments against discretionary case assignment from federal
constitutional case law).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463, 1467 (9th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Keane, 375 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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C. The Case Assignment Puzzle
The pattern thus far is courts vigorously self-regulating against
randomization on merits questions, while moderating that opposi-
tion when they are occasionally asked to second-guess the random-
ization policies of other institutions. Thus judicial opposition to
randomization looks parochial-and yet courts themselves provide
a leading example of systematic randomization in American
government.
Today the process of assigning cases to judges is pervaded with
lotteries. This form of randomization takes place in courts across the
nation, and some administrative agencies have followed suit.
Lotteries are a key part of the case assignment procedure in many
federal district courts, in the federal courts of appeals, in many state
trial courts and appellate courts, in federal immigration courts, and
elsewhere.'96 Randomization in this form touches perhaps millions
of cases per year.
Unfortunately, greater specificity about randomization's develop-
ment within case assignment systems is difficult to offer. There
seems to be no general historical account of randomization's rise in
case assignment protocols, nor an explanation for the holdouts."'
Nor is there an easily accessible guide to current case assignment
practices in, for example, the federal district courts. Those proce-
dures are curiously decentralized.'98 Unlike federal jury selection,
which is subject to statutory guidance,'99 judges tend to determine
their own case assignment procedures. Federal statutes authorize
196. See, e.g., Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response to Crisis in the Immigration
Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 24 (2006) (regarding immigration judges); Brown & Lee, supra
note 8, at 1069 (regarding federal circuit courts); Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a
Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 267, 292 (1996) (regarding
state courts).
197. There is accessible information on the development of single-judge case assignments
at the trial court level and away from so-called master calendar systems, see, e.g., Richard L.
Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1587 (2003) (recognizing
the shift), but that design choice can be made independently of the randomization issue.
198. Our picture of case assignment in the federal courts of appeals is clearer thanks to
Brown and Lee's extensive survey. In 2000, they reported that "[a]ll circuits purport to use
a system of random assignment of judges and cases" but also "permit a significant amount of
discretion in the assignment process." Brown & Lee, supra note 8, at 1069, 1074.
199. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) (2006) (requiring random selection of jurors in district courts).
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district courts to divide and conduct their business as they see fit, '
and allow the circuit courts to form panels howsoever they choose.2"1
Under this decentralized regime, some courts have not adopted
official rules on case assignment. The relatively small Southern
District of Alabama is one. It has published rules addressing
assignment of related and refiled cases, but not ordinary case
assignment.0 2 Those courts that have formal rules do not necessar-
ily explain in detail how cases and judges are matched and re-
matched. Somewhat similarly, the Social Security Administration
lacks a centralized assignment rule for disability benefits appeals.
Assignment mechanics have devolved to individual hearing
offices.20 3 Undoubtedly, assignment information is available inside
each adjudicative system and, at least partly, to local lawyers. But
as of today, it appears that no one source effectively aggregates this
information for outsiders.
Although definitive statements about the particulars of random-
ization's role cannot yet be made, an example or two can help
suggest the influence of randomization. Consider the Southern
District of New York. In 2007, it had twenty-eight authorized judge-
200. See 28 U.S.C. § 137 (2006) (authorizing circuit court judicial councils to make nec-
essary orders when district judges are unable to agree on case assignment rules or orders);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2006) (authorizing court rules "for the conduct of their business"
that are not inconsistent with federal statute or rules issued by the Supreme Court); FED. R.
CIv. P. 83(a)(1) (authorizing local rules by majority vote of district judges).
201. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2006); W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247,257-
58 (1953) (indicating courts of appeals' discretion to allocate work). A statutory constraint is
imposed on the Federal Circuit, which must rotate judges across panels "to ensure that all of
the judges sit on a representative cross section of the cases heard." 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2006).
202. See S.D. ALA. R. 3.3; see also JAMES C. DUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 414 (2007) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS] (reporting only three authorized
judgeships for the Southern District of Alabama); id. at 141,210 tbls.C, B & D (reporting only
346 criminal case filings and 980 civil case filings in the district). Random assignment might
be less likely in jurisdictions allotted few judges and a large geographic territory. It has been
reported that the District of North Dakota assigned its two active duty judges to two different
geographic divisions which handled all cases filed in those divisions. See ADVISORY GROUP FOR
THE DIST. OF N.D., REPORT OF THE CIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1993), reprinted in 69 N.D. L.
REV. 739, 752-53 (1993). This is not to say that the Southern District of Alabama has rejected
random assignment, only that its practice is not as formalized in official rules as it might be.
203. See OFFICE OF DISABILITY ADJUDICATION & REVIEW, HEARINGS, APPEALS AND
LITIGATION LAW MANUAL 1-2-0-2, 1-2-0-5 (2005) (stating that assignment to Administrative
Law Judges is controlled by each Hearing Office's Chief ALJ). Some SSA hearing offices may
employ a randomization element in their assignment procedure.
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ships and logged over 17,000 case filings.2"4 The local rules declare
that randomization is a component of case assignment: "All cases
shall be randomly assigned by the clerk or his designee in public
view in one of the clerk's offices in such a manner that each active
judge shall receive as nearly as possible the same number of
cases."2°5 Parties and their attorneys may ask to be present during
case selection. 20 6 Here the commitment to random case assignment
is very public, even if the court will not entertain formal objections
from litigants based on the local rule.2 7 An analogue from the
administrative law world involves international immigration. The
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge has authorized a computer-
ized case assignment system that assigns incoming cases by rotation
through lists of available immigration judges in each immigration
court.20 8
Still, no existing case assignment system is maximally random
across all decision makers. First of all, a decision maker might
deliberately circumvent a formal commitment to randomization.2 9
In addition, litigants may influence case assignment. To the extent
a plaintiff or prosecutor has discretion over venue, choosing a place
to file is also choosing a pool of judges. Litigants may also attempt
204. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 202, at 411 (reporting judgeships); id. at 139, 208
tbls. C & D (reporting 1026 criminal case filings and 16,125 civil case filings).
205. S. & E.D.N.Y. R. 50.2(b) (2009); see id. at 50.2(h) (allowing judges who are ill or
"overburdened" with cases to be removed from the wheel, and the chief judge and senior
judges to elect a reduced caseload); see also N.D. CAL. ORDER 44 (2003) (describing a random
case assignment system, at least for civil cases, and exceptions); D.D.C. R. 40.3(a) (2008)
(similar); N.D. ILL. R. 40.1(a) & 1999 comm. cmt. (2008) (stating that case assignment is by
lot except as specifically provided, that cases are randomized only within predefined
categories, and that randomization has been part of the process for fifty years).
206. See S. & E.D.N.Y. R. 50.2(b) (2009).
207. The rules indicate they are for internal management and not the basis for objections
by litigants. See S. & E.D.N.Y. R. 50.1 (2008) (preface); see also In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165,
1176-80 (9th Cir. 1986). But cf. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100, 1103 (10th Cir.
1972) (issuing a writ of mandamus against a chief judge who reassigned a randomly assigned
case in contravention of written local rules).
208. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
DOCKETING SYSTEM MANUAL II-1 (2009) ("In multiple Immigration Judge courts, cases are
assigned to each Immigration Judge's Master Calendar on a random rotational basis.").
209. See LYNN M. LOPuCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 46 (2005) (describing reasons to doubt that certain
major bankruptcy cases were randomly assigned to bankruptcy judges in New York in the
1980s); see also Brown & Lee, supra note 8, at 1044-65 (discussing allegations that certain
civil rights cases were assigned in the Fifth Circuit to influence outcomes).
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to game an otherwise random assignment system. A tactic used in
the past was to file multiple complaints involving the same
controversy and then voluntarily dismiss the complaints that were
assigned to the least sympathetic judges.210
Other exceptions to random assignment are officially condoned.
Many state court systems permit parties to exercise peremptory
strikes on judges initially assigned.21 Judges also tend to retain a
measure of control. A judge might recuse from a case or be assigned
all "related cases." The Southern District of New York's rule assigns
all habeas petitions and pro se civil suits filed by the same litigant
to the same judge.2" 2 Moreover, some systems incorporate the
possibility of discretionary departures from random assignment.
The Southern District of Florida's rules announce that assignments
may be modified "whenever necessary in the interest of justice and
expediency."2 3 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, which
is itself composed of judges selected by the Chief Justice, determines
which district judge will receive transferred actions without any
commitment to randomization." 4 Official rules might also enable
judges to trade cases. The Southern District of New York's local
rules authorize its chief judge to reassign any case with the consent
of the judges involved.21 Additionally, random court of appeals
panels are partially checked by nonrandom opinion assignment
practices.216
More broadly, adjudicative institutions are structured in ways
that delimit random assignment. These boundaries are part of the
debate over specialization in adjudication.217 Cases are certainly not
210. See, e.g., David Heckelman, 2 Lawyers Censured for Multiple-Suit Forum Shopping,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 28, 1995, at 1.
211. See Norwood, supra note 196, at 293 & n.128 (reporting that nineteen states allowed
preemptory strikes but that federal legislation on the matter had failed).
212. See S. & E.D.N.Y. R. 50.3(e) (2008).
213. S.D. FLA. R. 3.4(A) (2008).
214. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b), (d) (2006); 3 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG
ON CLASS ACTIONS § 9:17 (4th ed. 2002); see also Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial
Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 341, 364 (2004).
215. See S. & E.D.N.Y. R. 50.4 (2008).
216. See Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 526-48
(2008) (concluding that federal appellate judges commonly specialize via opinion-writing
assignments).
217. The literature on specialized tribunals is extensive and longstanding. See, e.g., Erwin
N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1944); Richard L.
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randomly assigned across all government adjudicators. The labor is
divided among institutions, such as the immigration system and the
traditional court system. Labor is partitioned again within institu-
tions, such as the various districts within the federal court system
and the divisions and specialized judge assignments within certain
trial courts.218 These boundaries define cohorts of decision makers
who will receive one stream of disputes rather than another.
Also worth noting is the norm in the United States of allowing
appeals to an authority that is not randomized. Thus the decision of
an administrative law judge might be appealed to the unitary head
of the relevant department, and state and federal trial court
judgments can be appealed to a supreme court that does not sit in
panels.219 Randomization influences case assignment on the front
lines of adjudication, while appellate structures offer the limited
hope of attracting the attention of nonrandomized decision makers
at the back end.
From another perspective, however, the above discussion has
greatly understated the role of chance in matching cases to judges.
If causal chains in human events are traced back far enough,
perhaps an observer can always identify an orthogonally if not
statistically random process that helped produce a dispute that
ended up before an agency or a court. Everything from outcomes in
Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1111 (1990); Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized
Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425 (1951). My point is that institutional boundaries are forms of
specialization, and that intra-institution case assignment systems can retard further
specialization (for example, random assignment) or advance it (for example, merit-driven
assignment).
218. See, e.g., Herbert Jacob, The Governance of Trial Judges, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 3, 11-
13, 21 (1997) (investigating the Cook County Chief Judge's power to assign judges to different
courtrooms entertaining different subject matter at different prestige levels).
219. Contrast the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, which is a
panel. See Andrew Drzemczewski, The Internal Organisation of the European Court of Human
Rights: The Composition of Chambers and the Grand Chamber, 3 EuR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233,
234-35, 239-42 (2000).
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the gene pool 220 to the concept of moral luck 221 can be associated
with lotteries that seriously influence the course of our lives.
That said, adjudicative institutions often deliberately inject
randomization into disputes at the point of case assignment.
Regardless of the uncontrolled forces that influence adjudication,
this intentional use of randomization needs a convincing defense.
Randomization does come with disadvantages. Most obviously, case
assignment lotteries fail to match decision makers with the cases for
which they are best suited. Partly for this reason, other organiza-
tions are not wedded to this form of labor allocation; it is not as if
practicing lawyers normally receive their paid work at random.222
Attempting to appoint multi-talented judges can accomplish only so
much. And there is a further complication: random case assignment
must be squared with a long tradition of judges condemning coin
flips on the merits.
III. DECISION MAKERS, DECISIONS, AND RANDOMIZATION
How should we view this combination of judicial positions?
Surely some part of the combination is understandable. If we focus
on the many modern justifications for randomization combined
with selective use by nonjudicial officials, there is nothing very
surprising about judges accepting the validity of lotteries in other
institutions. Furthermore, judicial tolerance for nonjudicial random-
ization rests easily with the spread of case assignment lotteries
within the judiciary. Judges could have adopted their assignment
lotteries based on the same sort of judgment that they respect in
nonjudicial institutions. Moreover, it might make sense for judges
to respect the ability of nonjudicial officials to decide when lotteries
are appropriate while simultaneously taking a hard line against
220. See GOODWIN, supra note 51, at 24-29 (discussing genetic lotteries and entrenched
social structures); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUsTIcE 63-64 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing a
natural lottery of talents, along with efforts to limit its influence on people's life chances).
221. See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 28 (1979) (discussing arguable connections
between bad luck and moral assessment).
222. For an exceptional instance of random case assignment in a public defender's office,
see David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case
Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1149, 1160-61, 1164 &
n.61 (2007) (noting, however, that the large majority of fifty other surveyed offices did not do
so).
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randomization on the merits in a courtroom. Perhaps judges can
find something especially problematic about merits randomization
on their home turf without imposing a similar conclusion on other
institutions.
Even if each of these conclusions is correct, however, we are left
with an especially awkward combination: judges habitually
randomize case assignments while they routinely punish merits
randomization. The problem is that case assignments and merits
decisions are connected, as Part III.A.1 explains. Case assignment
lotteries have a randomizing effect on merits decisions in hard
cases. In its worst light, then, the adjudicative system is at war with
itself. There are perspectives from which this conflict might be
denied, and they are explored in Part III.A.2. But in my judgment,
the more fruitful course is to accept tension within the system and
attempt to justify it. This path is admittedly complicated. Part III.B
acknowledges that case assignment lotteries do not effectively
randomize the same class of decisions recommended by ideal theory.
The task, therefore, is to recognize that the system neither elimi-
nates deliberate randomization nor approximates ideal randomi-
zation, and nevertheless defend the arrangement. Part III.C makes
the attempt. The argument depends heavily on the institutional
setting of adjudication and the needs of those who do not wear
robes.223
A. Is the System Effectively Randomizing the Merits?
1. Connecting Assignments with Outcomes
If all decision makers were exactly the same, then case assign-
ment would be irrelevant to outcomes. We could treat the
adjudicative system as if it had only one decision maker, and case
assignment would be decoupled from the distribution of merits
223. Much of the analysis below applies to administrative agencies as well as traditional
judiciaries, and I will speak to both. By the end of the discussion, however, institutional
setting will become sufficiently important that the argument will tend to rest on courts with
appointed judges. Likewise, most of the analysis applies to juries as well as judges, but I will
refer to judges for the sake of simplicity and to maintain a sharper focus. Juries might be
viewed and even defended as rough substitutes for overt merits randomization in difficult
cases that survive dispositive motions.
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decisions. Randomizing decision makers certainly would not mimic
flipping coins on the merits, and there would be no serious conflict
between a formal ban on merits randomization and a lottery-
influenced case assignment system.
The truth is that decision makers are different in outcome-
relevant ways. Within the same institution, such as a federal circuit
or an administrative agency, decision makers can seriously differ
along many dimensions. These personnel might have wildly differ-
ent knowledge bases, skill sets, subject matter interests, effort
levels, corruption tolerance levels, and worldviews or ideologies. The
mixture depends on the appointments mechanism and various
selection effects.
To simplify, decision makers vary by "competence" and "ide-
ology." '224 Competence refers to the ability to achieve preferred goals
and ideology to the goals that are preferred. In addition, some
decision makers will be intensely committed to a particular ideology
regardless of additional considerations, while others will be open to
accommodating the norms of other people or of their institutional
position. To be sure, these are simplistic definitions, and articulat-
ing the relationships among competence, ideology, ideological
intensity, and law is challenging." The uncontroversial thought is
that characteristics of individual decision makers vary and these
characteristics can influence how decision makers assess the merits
of particular cases--especially, but not only, when conventional
legal analysis indicates decision-maker discretion.22
We also know that cases differ. No institution is sufficiently
specialized to face precisely the same questions across the docket
and across time. Simplifying again, cases are "hard" or "easy." Cases
224. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter? Implications of
Judicial Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 853,860,866-67
(2008) (discussing appointments considerations and judges' ideology, legislative competence,
and judicial competence).
225. For a productive analysis of the links between "law" and "ideology," see Pauline T.
Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 404, 408-17 (2007) (pointing out that
preference-driven decisions can be legally authorized through conscious delegation or
inevitable vagueness, and that some judges personally prefer to follow legal norms).
226. See, e.g., RICHARDA. POSNER, HOWJUDGESTHINK 93-121 (2008) [hereinafter POSNER,
HOW JUDGES THINK]; see also FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEAIS 69-93 (2007) (finding modest effects of certain background characteristics-beyond
the proxy for ideology-on judicial votes in the federal courts of appeals).
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might be hard because the historical facts are contested or derive
from an unfamiliar setting, because the appropriate legal norm is
unclear, because the relevant consequences of different outcomes
are difficult to predict, or for another reason.227 Perhaps there is an
objective sense in which the division between close calls and clear
answers can be made, a test detached from individual judgment.
But there certainly is a subjective sense in which this division
exists. From their personal perspectives, decision makers will expe-
rience varying degrees of difficulty in addressing questions posed to
them.
Occasionally, the differences among decision makers will be
irrelevant. A subset of cases might be so difficult by any measure
that every available decision maker would consider them hard, or
so simple that everyone would experience them as easy and reach
the same result-but the reality is different for every other issue.
Less competent decision makers will probably find a larger
fraction of cases hard, compared to highly competent decision
makers who might see only easy cases. Hence one group of decision
makers might be able to resolve a given case without much effort,
whereas another group would face extraordinary difficulty in merely
understanding the choices to be made. We should expect the error
rates of these decision makers to vary, regardless of how "error" is
defined.
As for ideology, its relationship to hard and easy cases is less
obvious. An intense ideological commitment might convert other-
wise hard cases into easy cases. Ideology might eliminate complexi-
ties generated by conventional legal argument or boundaries of the
decision maker's role. For the pure ideologue, all of this can be
swept away in favor of achieving as much self-defined justice as
possible. It also seems plausible, however, that only some cases are
amenable to ideological influence, either because of their character
or the character of those who become adjudicators. The answers to
some fraction of questions in the pool of cases are probably so clear
under the settled norms of legal argument that no one within the
institution differs as to their correct resolution, at least after a little
227. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 254-58 (1986) (discussing efforts to resolve
hard cases of interpretation through fit and justification); POsNER, How JUDGES THINK, supra
note 226, at 205-06 (discussing time constraints and diverse dockets).
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effort. An illustration would be a relatively specific rule, perhaps a
filing deadline, that is enforced against a party whose ideological
goals otherwise align with the decision maker.
These stylized categories reflect adjudication in the real world,
and it follows that randomized case assignment influences outcomes
in some sense. The random element in matching judges to cases
means that a class of disputes will be resolved differently depending
on which judge the lottery spits out. The probability of a different
randomly selected decision maker producing a different outcome
depends on several factors, of course. Extreme variances in ideology,
maximum ideological intensity, modest competence levels, vague
standards in substantive law, and an otherwise challenging docket
imply that outcomes will be principally determined by case assign-
ment. But random assignment makes no effort to smooth out the
differences, and over time, it ensures that very different decision
makers will receive very similar cases. So although measuring the
influence of random assignment depends on a comparison to an-
other system, other assignment procedures are unlikely to guaran-
tee such variance because they do not so tightly link outcomes with
randomization. 28
The basic point about decision-maker variance is mundane to
those who practice law before courts and agencies, where judge-
shopping is a real desire. Yet our understanding of adjudicator
diversity is deepening with a new wave of empirical studies. 229 True,
the variables for ideology are hardly perfect and measuring com-
228. See infra Part III.C.2.c (discussing merit-based and political assignment).
229. See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 272-329
(2005) (reviewing studies). For intriguing recent efforts, see, for example, CROSS, supra note
226; Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
18-49 (2008); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006); David S. Abrams et al., Do
Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race? 3-4 (Amer. Law & Econ. Ass'n, Working Paper No.
93, 2008), available at http:/Ilaw.bepress.com/cgi viewcontent.cgi?article=2568&context=alea
(concluding that some state trial judges were even more likely to incarcerate African
American defendants than were other judges, but finding no statistically significant difference
in sentence length across judges); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial
Behavior: A Statistical Study (U. Chi. Law Sch. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 404, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126403. Perhaps the first study to capitalize on
(orthogonally) random case assignment is Frederick J. Gaudet et al., Individual Differences
in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, 23 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811, 812-13 (1933)
(stating that sentencing judges rotated).
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petence is not an uncontroversial task.23° But we can be quite sure
that judges differ in ideology and competence, and that in some
percentage of cases the outcome will be influenced by the identity of
the decision maker. To the extent this is so, we can be sure that
random case assignment drives results.
Asylum voting offers a startling example. One recent study of
immigration judges in New York City shows their asylum grant
rates ranging from 90 percent all the way down to 5 percent, and
filling many gradations in between.23' Asylum voting on the federal
courts of appeals might be less disparate but is still markedly
different across judges. A study of the Ninth Circuit shows pro-
asylum voting rates peaking at over 60 percent for one judge and
falling deep into single-digit percentages for several others.232 The
numbers need not be so dramatic to make the point. On far less
variance, we might still charge that the adjudicative system's actual
operation is inconsistent with its loud opposition to flipping coins on
the merits--opposition that manifests itself in professional sanc-
tions, not simply error correction on appeal. Sometimes a case
assignment lottery is, in effect, the method of dispute resolution.233
2. On Minimizing the Significance of Assignment
Before moving on, however, we should entertain perspectives on
which certain consequences of assignment randomization might
be ignored or minimized. One such perspective is roughly deon-
tological: perhaps a system that randomizes judges who are then
forbidden to randomize their merits decisions should be conceptu-
ally separated from a system that allows its judges to flip coins in
230. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice:
An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 32 (2004) (measuring
citations, published opinions, and the "independence" of appellate judges); Daniel A. Farber,
Supreme Court Selection and Measures of Past Judicial Performance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1175, 1176-92 (2005) (questioning the usefulness of these measures).
231. See Alexander, supra note 196, at 22-23 tbl.2.
232. See David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum
Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 852 fig.8 (2005).
233. Cf. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication,
60 STAN. L. REv. 295, 302 (2007) (stating that asylum results "may be determined as much
or more by" the decision maker's identity or the court's location as by the case facts and law).
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hard cases.2" The alternative perspective is consequentialist but ex
ante in orientation: perhaps the consequences of assignment
randomization should be treated like overt merits randomization,
and the consequences shrugged off from an ex ante perspective on
the system.
As for the deontological perspective, it depends on the reasons
why merits randomization might be objectionable. Some plausible
objections might apply only to merits randomization and not to
assignment randomization. This would provide a basis for ignoring
the randomizing effects of assignment lotteries on merits outcomes.
To be sure, some potential objections to merits randomization
apply perfectly well to assignment randomization given diversity
among decision makers. If we simply value like cases being treated
alike, in the sense that the outcomes in adjudication ought to be
similar, then both merits randomization and assignment random-
ization are threats. If we value predictability in adjudication, then
both practices are problematic. These commitments offer no reason
for blinding ourselves to the consequences of random assignment.
But other complaints have a better chance of making the
distinction. Suppose that overt merits lotteries have a uniquely
insulting quality that gives rise to a justified feeling of disrespect.
This complaint might be especially compelling when a judge
randomizes on the merits to avoid excessive decision costs, but it
might be similarly persuasive when a judge is simply uncertain
about the correct result after an exhaustive effort. In either
situation, litigants might have a justified expectation that adjud-
icators will have better grounds for affecting their lives than the
dictates of chance. Furthermore, one might believe that such
lotteries violate a sound commitment to reason in merits de-
cisions.235 The basic thought is that officials, and perhaps especially
234. I assume here that a merits randomization ban is possible, ignoring the objection that
certain tiebreaking rules in law are essentially orthogonal randomization devices. See supra
notes 142-49 and accompanying text. For ease of exposition, I have not specified the
assignment system at work in the hypothetical merits randomization regime. This should not
weaken the arguments explored here. Note, however, that a random assignment system
combined with merits randomization would exacerbate the overuse concerns raised below. See
infra Part III.C.1.
235. See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1004 (2008)
("When legal and political officials lack sufficient reasons for their decisions, they fail to
respect the rational capacities of those subject to their authority.") (footnote omitted); see also
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judges, ought to have rational reasons for decisions that influence
the lives of otherwise nonconsenting persons. This preference for
reasons might go beyond reason-having to actual reason-giving,
which lotteries themselves cannot offer. In other words, adjudicators
might feel a moral obligation to provide adequate reasons for their
merits decisions to losing parties, in order to respect those parties
as rational agents. These commitments to respect and to reason-
giving could then reinforce each other, with the provision of reasons
averting feelings of disrespect.
At the same time, random case assignment might sidestep these
objections regardless of its influence on case outcomes. It is not clear
how to elaborate this intuition, but it would not be surprising if
many people made normative distinctions between forms of ran-
domization in subtly different contexts. Perhaps a robust moral
theory would single out judicial dispute resolution as a place where
randomization is most likely to be insulting36 or deficient in
rational explanation, and distinguish it from arguably less personal
applications such as random sampling for the census, bellwether
trials, or even law enforcement auditing. Perhaps people under-
stand resort to chance in litigation as an inappropriate assertion
of power when law's reasons run out. If merits randomization is
qualitatively special, then the mere influence of assignment ran-
domization on outcomes is not enough to condemn the system.
Thus it could be that assigning cases neither triggers an obligation
of rational explanation nor otherwise disrespects the affected
litigants.237
Jody S. Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Legal Justification, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1773, 1786
(2007) (arguing that an area of law "can be justified only by identifying moral reasons that
fully determine the results of adjudication").
236. See, e.g., Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Shull, 651 S.E.2d 648, 652, 674 (Va.
2007) (finding a "grave and substantial" violation of the Canons of Judicial Conduct, in part
because the judge's coin flip in a custody matter "denigrated the litigants whose case he
decided').
237. Compare the philosophical doctrine of double effect, which can eliminate moral
culpability for the consequences of certain actions. See, e.g., THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE
EFFECT: PHILOSOPHERS DEBATE A CONTROVERSIAL MORAL PRINCIPLE (Paul A. Woodward ed.,
2001); Christopher Kaczor, Double-Effect Reasoning from Jean Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer,
59 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 297, 297-99 (1998) (describing an evolution in reasoning that lifts
blame from some injurious consequences of human action); Daniel P. Sulmasy, Commentary:
Double Effect-Intention Is the Solution, Not the Problem, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 26, 27-28
(2000) (distinguishing culpability for intended harms from responsibility for consequences of
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A fully specified argument along these lines might persuade some
observers, but its potential is seriously limited. The first limitation
is that such distinctions will be unsatisfying to committed con-
sequentialists. Consequentialists cannot ignore the effect on case
outcomes simply because randomization takes place in another
room, or because intent to harm was absent. Even those attracted
to "double-effect" reasoning may consider the proportionality of good
and bad consequences in evaluating the morality of a system. 8
Moreover, it is quite unclear why case assignment is exempt from
norms of reason-having or reason-giving in adjudication. An
exemption would be understandable if decision makers were fully
interchangeable, but that is not our reality. Even if we assume a
basic level of ability shared by all, differences in competence and
ideology will make some adjudicators more suited to a given case
than others. With so much riding on some assignments, and with
assignment systems often controlled by the same officials who will
decide the assigned cases, the demand for reasons seems no less
strong in this context. The reply cannot simply be that there are
good moral reasons for randomizing assignments; there are good
moral reasons for randomizing merits decisions, as we have seen.
In any event, it is hard to discern a universal commitment to
reason-giving (or even reason-having) in a system that still occasion-
ally relies on black-box jury verdicts, that permits snap judgments
from trial judges on certain evidentiary questions, and that allows
supreme courts unexplained discretion over part of their dockets.
There is no reason to believe that our adjudicative systems are
committed to reasons at all costs, and no obvious way to cate-
gorically distinguish assignments from merits decisions once we
understand that the commitment is qualified.
Objections based on the value of respect are equally contestable.
Overtly randomizing merits decisions can be a sign of acute
rationality and respect for the parties, rather than an insult. This
depends on the manner in which lotteries are executed,239 but I see
action in a true dilemma); see also JOHN FINNIS, JOSEPH BOYLE & GERMAIN GRIsEz, NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE, MORALITY, AND REALISM 310 (1987) (distinguishing chosen consequences from
unintended yet foreseen side effects, including death).
238. See, e.g., Sulmasy, supra note 237, at 29.
239. For a rather insulting use of orthogonal randomization to resolve a scheduling dispute
between two "bickering attorneys," see Roger Parloff, Judge Orders Lawyers to Play Game,
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nothing inherently disrespectful about randomizing after an
appropriate level of effort on the merits. Randomization is the mark
of humility in decision making when a conscientious adjudicator
openly admits the limits of reason and, considering alternative
decision rules, explains that randomization is the rare yet appropri-
ate response. When operationalized in this fashion, the decision to
randomize is drenched with reason. And the alternative might be
impermissible grounds for decision dressed up as convincing
rationales, or the covert use of arbitrary decision methods, or the
multiplication of contestable tiebreakers.24 ° Of course, randomizing
a merits decision for no good reason would be disrespectful and
there might be few justified occasions for it. But no one is proposing
uninhibited merits randomization. To the extent that merits
lotteries are seldom justified, pervasive assignment randomization
begins to look that much worse in a system with decision-maker
diversity.
Finally, if a respectful purpose is the touchstone of propriety,
reviewing the development of random case assignment and
nonrandom merits decisions may cause concern. The story of this
development might not show a public spirited purpose that could
insulate random assignment from scrutiny of its consequences.24'
The system's designers might have been too self-interested or care-
less for that. Forbidding merits randomization on public relations
grounds would raise similar complications.242 Thus, deontological
arguments for ignoring the influence of random assignment on case
outcomes probably have limited value, even for deontologists.
Another way to resolve the tension can be addressed more briefly.
Worries about the consequences of random assignment are reduced
if we view adjudicative institutions ex ante. This perspective puts
aside distributive concerns and focuses on the ability of people to
adjust their behavior in advance of litigation. Insofar as those
subject to adjudication have information about the panoply of
decision makers, they can aggregate these data into a composite
FORTUNE, June 7, 2006.
240. See supra Part II.A.2. It is also possible that offense from randomization expressed by
litigants is feigned or a product of unwanted outcomes.
241. See infra Part III.C.2.a.
242. See infra Part III.C.1.
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which will inform them of overall risks and opportunities. Informed
observers will be able to predict likely outcomes and plan accord-
ingly, even if decision makers differ radically.243 The case assign-
ment system will provide guidance on the probability of each
decision maker receiving responsibility for the issue of concern.
This is not to imply that there is no basis for protest when cases
receive different treatment solely because one decision maker was
assigned instead of another. For many people, the distribution of
outcomes is an independent normative concern. Even if it should not
be, a case assignment procedure must be chosen. Concluding that
we are uninterested in the distributive consequences for litigants
does not tell us which of all feasible assignment rules is superior,
nor can it resolve the apparent tension within the judicial position
on randomization. In this respect, the ex parte perspective is
nonresponsive
Nonetheless, it is worth recounting ways in which the influence
of random assignment is already moderated. First, precedent can
matter. Institutions with a commitment to stare decisis will reduce
the influence of decision-maker identity when a decision deemed
relevant has already been made. Of course, the character of any
such precedent could have been influenced by random assignment.
But stare decisis is not the only moderating force; the right to
appeal will also have an effect. The pattern in the United States is
a right to seek review from nonrandomly selected adjudicators.2 4
The preferences of these superiors will likely influence decision
making at lower levels in the hierarchy, depending on how powerful
appeal rights are in practice. Finally, the pool of potential adjudica-
tors for any given controversy easily could be more diverse than it
is. These officeholders are nothing like a random sample of the adult
population, and institutional boundaries indicate a measure of
decision-maker specialization. Each of these forces reduces the
significance of deliberately random assignment, without eliminating
it.
243. See generally Adam M. Samaha, Judicial Transparency in an Age of Prediction, 53
VILL. L. REV. 829, 830-35 (2008) [hereinafter Samaha, Judicial Transparency].
244. See supra Part II.C.
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B. Is the System Optimally Randomizing the Merits?
Given that random case assignment will effectively randomize
merits decisions with some frequency, is this consequence welcome
or unacceptable? For some observers, the answer will be the latter.
Those who lean hard against merits randomization have cause for
dismay, because most reasons for such opposition carry over to
random case assignment. Anti-randomizers might turn to abstract
principles such as the rule of law, treating like cases alike, and
reasoned decision making over submission to chance.24 At least
from a consequentialist perspective, random assignment to a pool of
decision makers with serious differences threatens these principles.
To be clear, the basis for these objections is partly the differences
across decision makers, not random assignment per se. Cases might
be assigned according to perceived levels of decision-maker compe-
tence without eliminating the objection. Highly competent decision
makers sometimes differ in their ideologies, and so case assignment
would still be related to case outcomes. Thus, the above objections
might prompt institutional design changes quite apart from case
assignment-such as altering the appointments process to minimize
decision-maker differences; or training, monitoring, and sanctioning
decision makers to achieve greater uniformity in judgment; or
further subdividing adjudicative institutions into more specialized
tribunals; or revising substantive law toward rules rather than
standards.246 Nevertheless, assignment randomization might be
especially troubling to opponents of merits randomization. A case
assignment lottery virtually guarantees that like cases will be
treated unalike over the long run, making no attempt to assign the
same kinds of cases to the same subset of semi-specialized decision
makers.247
A more interesting question is how randomization enthusiasts
should react to the reality that, every day, an untold number of
merits decisions are being driven by assignment lotteries. Nothing
about this fact alone should bother this group. They might be
245. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing equal protection and due process principles).
246. See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 233, at 380-89 (regarding immigration judge
quality, training, oversight, and norms).
247. Cf Cheng, supra note 216, at 555-56 (discussing the benefits of judicial specialization).
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pleased by it, seeing virtues in randomization for a limited domain
of difficult merits issues. Randomizing case assignments across a
diverse set of decision makers might appear to be a substitute for
randomizing those merits decisions, and perhaps the closest thing
to overt merits randomization that proponents can hope for.248 This
is more likely true if hard cases are most susceptible to differential
treatment by different judges in the case assignment pool. Hard
cases are a class of problems that merits randomizers try to solve,
and hard cases are where random assignment most likely makes its
mark.
But if the existing system functions as a substitute for ideal
merits randomization, it is a rough substitute. The system operates
much differently from the visions of optimal merits randomization
indicated by the normative theories reviewed so far. First of all, the
existing system will not confess the absence of rationally explicable
reasons for some of its results. There are theorists who demand an
acknowledgment of indeterminacy along with resort to chance.249 In
contrast, when random assignment drives results, reasons are
nevertheless provided in an attempt to justify every significant
merits determination, sometimes with certitude.
Equally important, it is the combination of a lottery plus its pool
membership that must be justified. There is no reason to believe
that the actual pool of adjudicators represents a random distribu-
tion in any pertinent sense. Current methods for selecting adjudica-
tors are not well designed to produce, for example, equal probabili-
ties across feasible outcomes on issues that remain debatable after
an appropriate investment of effort. The normative theories for
randomization canvassed above seem to envision an admirable
decision maker coming to the conclusion that a lottery is the best
tool available and then running it with a set of plausible outcomes.
If we try to compare this ideal randomizer to the effect of random
assignment on hard cases, there is an important gap: the set of hard
cases susceptible to influence by case assignment will be determined
by the competence and ideology of a decidedly nonrandomly chosen
248. Compare John Coons's argument of twenty years ago: "Randomness may be inevitable,
but it must express itself indirectly and even covertly at that point in the process where the
human decider is selected." Coons, supra note 8, at 110.
249. See supra note 139.
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pool of decision makers. Objectively identifying the set of hard cases
without reference to the existing set of judges might not be possible.
Randomization works in conjunction with another variable-the
pool of decision makers-to produce merits outcomes. A simple
reference to optimal merits randomization under ideal theory is not
enough.
To be fair, those willing to assess the system over more than one
generation are less likely to view it as a controversially weighted
lottery. Long-term cycles in decision maker attributes might bring
the system closer to idealized merits randomization. A crude
measure ofjudicial ideology suggests oscillation in the federal courts
over the years, even if the courts are rarely in ideological equipoise
at any one moment.25 °
Yet complications remain. One is the morally controversial
position that generations ought to be ignored. Some observers will
reasonably deny that benefits accruing to people like them in the
distant future is on par with benefits accruing to them in the
present.25' Another question is the significance of stare decisis and
other ways in which past decisions become privileged. If these forces
are influential, then the sequence of decisions will matter.
Finally, the suggested transgenerational timeframe accounts for
evolving variance in ideology, but decision makers differ in compe-
tence levels as well. Randomizing case assignment tends to increase
errors on the merits compared to a system that pays attention to
individual decision-maker skills. It means that some hard cases will
be handled by the least equipped decision maker available, and
some cases that would be easy for one set of adjudicators will be
resolved by those who find them exceedingly difficult. This is
nothing like identifying a justifiable domain for randomization on
the merits according to a well thought out normative theory. The
current system tends to expand the domain of randomization
beyond what is recommended by ideal theorizing.
250. See Jonathan P. Kastellec, Partisan Composition and Voting on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals over Time 28 (June 18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author)
(showing the mix of Democratic- and Republican-nominated appointees on the federal courts
of appeals by year since the 1920s).
251. Cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 6 THE WORKS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3, 8-9 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904) ("[B]y the law of nature, one generation
is to another as one independant [sic] nation to another.").
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If there is a convincing defense for random assignment, it cannot
be a quick reference to approximating optimal merits randomiza-
tion. Institutions that randomize case assignments are working off
a peculiar pool with distance from the domain for randomization
that ideal theory would recommend. Both randomization enthusi-
asts and randomization skeptics have reasons to regret the current
system's apparent schizophrenia, on a first take.
C. Can the Arrangement Be Defended?
A plausible defense for something like today's system might yet
be constructed, even if it is suboptimally randomizing merits de-
cisions. The first stage of the defense loosens the attraction of
randomizing merits decisions in adjudication, although it is more
suggestive than conclusive. The second stage turns to case assign-
ment. It presents educated guesses on why such randomization
became appealing to adjudicators, which might produce sympathy
for their choices. This internal view is then supplemented by an
outsider argument for random assignment. The analysis thus moves
from internal management issues to focus on the perspective of
litigants as a class and society as a whole within a particular
institutional setting.
From this broader perspective, random assignment can be
defended as (1) fairly allocating to litigants the tragically scarce and
indivisible resource of judicial excellence, (2) roughly honoring the
politics of the judicial appointments process, and (3) continuing a
natural experiment on the determinants of judicial behavior.
Although these social benefits do not resolve all tension with a
merits randomization ban, they do not entail a preference for merits
randomization either. The benefits follow whether or not adjudica-
tors flip coins on the merits. Finally, an alternative to random
assignment will be compared: litigants might be authorized to
choose judges more like they choose juries. This "political" allocation
option has advantages, but probably is outperformed by random
assignment in certain key respects. More important than this
specific conclusion, however, is the general point that randomization
in adjudication can be thoroughly evaluated only in relation to its
larger institutional setting.
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1. Forbidding Merits Randomization
In a more perfect world, we might believe merits randomization
would have a foothold in courts resolving difficult controversies. It
is extremely unlikely that the theoretically correct number of
lotteries in merits adjudication is zero. Based on available informa-
tion and putting aside public relations problems, Judge Brown's
determination to randomize one narrow and equally matched child
custody argument is a better candidate for encouragement than for
rebuke.252 A firm judicial commitment against merits randomization
could instead be founded on a realistically imperfect rather than an
ideal world.
The first step is to remember that adjudicators cannot rationally
adhere to a flat rule in favor of deliberate randomization on all
issues. This would be catastrophic. Adjudicative institutions would
be offering all parties an equal chance of prevailing without any
quality control on the claims. Indeed, the system would encourage
the proliferation of outlandish claims following the wildest dreams
of every pleader. If there is to be a relatively simple rule in this
field, it must flatly prohibit merits randomization.
The alternative is a more flexible standard. Indeed, a somewhat
vague set of recommendations for randomization's proper domain
was what Part I offered. Perhaps there exist subclasses of cases in
which randomization is plainly appropriate; perhaps this category
extends beyond land partition allotments. 5 ' For the time being,
however, it is difficult to restate randomization's optimal domain
any more specifically than a restatement of negligence's perfected
scope, or the exact location at which liability rules should give way
to property rules, or even when rules become worse than standards.
Consider, for example, lottery recommendations that rest on un-
certainty."' Before turning to randomization as a tiebreaker,
decision makers must be adequately certain about their uncertainty.
They must be prepared to conclude that the decision they face is not
worth additional effort, or that relevant information cannot be
obtained at a tolerable cost. This is not a self-executing instruction.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 107-15.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 133-36.
254. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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What should be compared, then, is a simple prohibition with a
loose standard within a particular institutional setting. Assuming
that the choice between these two legal regimes will not influence
the composition of decision makers and holding all else equal, we
can speculate about how actual judges would conduct themselves in
a hypothetical universe in which merits randomization was open to
them based on their best judgment, and compare that picture to the
situation we have now. Guesswork might be necessary, but it is the
correct inquiry.
For those lacking confidence in the relevant decision makers,
supporting a merits-randomization ban is understandable. One
concern with discretion is that sloppy adjudicators might over-rely
on lotteries. Randomization's optimal domain is challenging to
specify, but lotteries are remarkably easy to run. For those who do
not care enough about the quality of their judgments, merits
randomization is a low cost tool for docket clearing. Of course
randomizers must compose a list of outcomes on which the lottery
will run, but careful itemization need not bother a decision maker
seeking convenient ways to resolve cases that seem difficult.
Without effective monitoring of judicial effort, perhaps randomiza-
tion would become too tempting in too many instances. Further-
more, it might be that government needs at least one outfit that
refuses or denies the role of chance. Adjudicators fill that role, and
perhaps they comfort the political community by assuring its
members that reasoned answers are forthcoming.255 Finally, it could
well be that the justifiable domain for merits randomization is quite
small. Perhaps actual situations of indeterminacy after appropriate
effort are sufficiently rare such that wrestling with a merits ran-
domization standard is not worth it.256 Better to forbid the practice
and be done with it.
A randomization ban also might have desirable incentive effects
apart from public acceptance. Perhaps decision makers will work
harder to achieve reasonable degrees of certainty in challenging
cases, and perhaps they will more often aspire to craft rationally
defensible outcomes. The ban might be a mechanism for construct-
255. Cf. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82,
92 (1986) (noting the importance of an appearance that adjudicatory results are proper).
256. See DWORKIN, supra note 140, at 286-87 (suggesting rarity in developed systems).
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ing good judges by envisioning a high standard for judgment and
influencing judges' self-perceptions within the office, even if the
standard is sometimes impossible to meet. This view is awkwardly
optimistic and skeptical about decision-maker behavior at the same
time. Plus we could imagine judges acting with less care under a
randomization ban in order to retain the guidance of underinformed
first impressions. But there is something to the aspirational view of
the ban.
Reintroducing the issue of public relations, however, complicates
the matter. Favoring sanctions for fellow judges who randomize is
not an entirely autonomous preference. Judges are concerned with
negative perceptions generated by coin-flipping colleagues." 7 Public
opposition to merits randomization might never abate given limited
information about judicial and administrative operations. The pub-
lic seems to see randomization by judges as a sign of arrogance,
incompetence, or trivialization.258 In the prevailing decision envir-
onment, merits randomization is likely underused and almost
certainly not overused from the perspective of ideal theory.
In one respect, this take on public opinion is too static. A scenario
in which merits randomization can take place on anything ap-
proaching a regular basis presupposes an environment in which the
public response is not to shut down the practice. The alternative
world must be more accepting of merits randomization. Indeed,
additional leniency in the general public suggests added risk of over-
use. An even deeper problem is getting merits randomization jump
started. Were merits randomization ever formally authorized, it
might not be used. Reputation-conscious judges would probably
never draw lots, if for no other reason than the resulting public
perceptions in the absence of better information about judicial effort
and good faith. Nonrandomizing judges would appear admirable
compared to their randomizing colleagues, however conscientious
the latter group might be. The equilibrium would be little or no
overt merits randomization in adjudication, just as it is today.
The conclusion here is not firm. Merits randomization offers a
constructive and honest solution for a slice of issues in challenging
257. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
258. See supra Part II.A.1 (relying on disciplinary authorities' perceptions of public
opinion).
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cases. One could conclude that adjudicators face too much popular
resistance to randomization, and that the existing ban is pathologi-
cal.2"' Yet if this resistance were to dissipate, there is a risk that
decision makers would turn to merits randomization too quickly,
absent a preset category of issues for which randomization is the
best response and an effective strategy for monitoring judicial effort.
Moreover, the justified occasions for randomization might well be
few, and the likelihood of judges exercising discretion to randomize
is fairly low. This is enough to assess the merits randomization ban
as understandable and resilient, even if not plainly best for the long
term good.
2. Justifying Assignment Randomization
We also know that the system is effectively randomizing outcomes
in a subset of cases through the lottery element of case assignment,
and that this subset seems less than ideal. So there must be
substantial concern with assignment randomization as it now
functions, especially if a merits randomization ban is sound policy.
A sensible evaluation of random assignment must be comparative,
however, judging it in relation to other options such as merit-based
assignment and political assignment according to litigant prefer-
ences. This comparison ought to take place with careful attention to
other institutional details.
a. An Internal Account
Comfort might be found in an explanation for randomization's
spread into case assignment. Understanding the actual motivations
for the system's development might inspire persuasive normative
arguments for its retention or expansion. The hitch is that we lack
a comprehensive history of case assignment systems in courts or
agencies. Once assignment systems are seen as crucial to sound
institutional design, perhaps illuminating historical accounts will
emerge. But this has yet to occur on a large scale, and decentralized
institutional design makes a comprehensive account difficult. In this
space, I can offer thoughts about the system's development that are
259. See supra Part IIA.2 (vetting the ban's weaknesses).
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a bit deeper than speculation-along with an argument for why
understanding the history of case assignment will not exhaust the
relevant considerations.2 °
Accounting for random assignment's emergence in adjudicative
institutions requires reference to several other design choices. First,
legislatures had to draw some jurisdictional boundaries and then
populate the resulting institutions with multiple decision makers
unable or unauthorized to hear all filed cases. Until a geographi-
cally bounded district is assigned more than one trial judge, for
example, no case assignment issue can possibly exist. Instead, case
assignment would effectively take place through a combination of
jurisdictional and structural boundaries, along with the appoint-
ments process for judges.2 '1 True, appointed judges in this setting
might yet influence the mix of cases they receive and might find
ways of coordinating or competing with other judges. But that
situation is different from typical designs today, in which multiple
judges are deliberately stationed under one institutional roof and do
not share all filed cases.262
In these settings, judges face an allocation issue. The resulting
internal political problem is easy to see, especially if the appoint-
ments process produces significant differences across judges at any
one time. Given multiple judges, growing dockets, and delegation to
a group of officials believing themselves entitled to roughly equal
status, randomization must have seemed viable against other
options. A salient alternative would be to delegate discretionary
authority to a chief judge, other administrative officer, or a commit-
tee of agents with authority to make judgments on which cases were
most appropriate for which judges. But this option would fade with
any distrust and disagreement among judges. Agents might use
their assignment power to steer cases away from a disfavored class
of judges or, at the very least, to maintain an existing pecking order
or division of expertise that incoming judges might prefer to disrupt.
Unease with a relatively discretionary system is likely to have been
greater in groups with serious ideological disagreements.
260. The comments below will fit better with judicial case assignment than with the
process in administrative agencies, but there is overlap.
261. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 3 (1789) (authorizing one district judge
per district).
262. See SOLOMON & SOMERLOT, supra note 9, at 33-34.
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There are additional reasons for multi-decision-maker groups to
choose random assignment over the alternatives. There might be a
preference for variety and generalist judgeships among those who
find their way to the office.263 Variety will usually follow random
assignment over time, to the degree that the institution is otherwise
built to capture a diverse docket. Furthermore, a lottery system is
relatively cheap to conduct. It allows for less or no thinking about
which judges should get which cases, it need not require the
collection of any information about incoming cases, and, to the
extent that trading cases is restricted, it avoids those transactions
as well. Finally, the judge shopping risk is worth mentioning.
Parties will have less certainty about which decision maker will be
assigned to their dispute if assignment is random rather than
matched to observable decision-maker attributes. At the extreme,
and to the extent a party has power over venue, choosing the
location for dispute resolution is tantamount to selecting a particu-
lar decision maker.
These internal rationales for randomization-distrust of author-
ity, feelings of equal status, preference for a diverse docket,
thwarting strategic behavior by litigants-have been suggested in
official2" and unofficial sources.26 They resemble the justifications
for randomization explored in Part I.
263. A selection effect from a nonrandom case assignment process makes this factor less
likely to have been influential. At the margin, one could expect a pool of people inclined
toward specialization to find their way to the bench. However, other factors were sufficiently
powerful to produce the spread of random case assignment and, once randomization became
the norm, a self-reinforcing selection effect might have taken place. At the margin, one could
now expect the pool of aspiring judges to slant toward generalism. Random case assignment
makes it more difficult to attract experts dedicated to a relatively narrow subject matter, and
easier to attract those who feel that their expertise is "judging" more generally. Cf. POSNER,
How JUDGES THINK, supra note 226, at 165-67 (describing the potential advantages of a
federal judgeship over specialized legal careers in academia or in practice).
264. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. R. 40.1 comm. cmt. (1999) (discussing equitable division of labor);
United States v. Phillips, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1180 (D. Utah 1999) (offering an anti-judge
shopping rationale when a prosecutor moved for reassignment, and adding that random
assignment can promote "fairness and impartiality" and reduce "favoritism and bias"); United
States v. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61, 61 (D. Mass. 1992) (asserting that random assignment
prevents judge shopping and ensures "an equitable distribution of the case load among the
judges of this court").
265. See Susan Willet Bird, Note, The Assignment of Cases to Federal District Judges, 27
STAN. L. REv. 475, 475-76 & n.2 (1975) (relying partly on interviews of court personnel and
citing concerns about discretionary assignment and judge shopping).
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But this account of the adoption of random case assignment is, in
one regard, quite narrow. Aside from a judge shopping concern, the
arguments are steeped in internal management and lack much
connection with the interests of the larger public. This is not to say
that judges have no such concern, or that they cannot perceive a
relationship between self-engineered institutional design and effects
beyond judicial personnel. It does suggest that outsiders to adjudi-
cative institutions will not find complete satisfaction with the case
assignment system by investigating the reasons for its creation. One
must seriously wonder whether the downsides of randomization-if
nothing else, the mistakes on the merits associated with a roughly
even spread of subject matter across all decision makers--could be
overcome simply by judicial convenience and the dampening of
judge shopping. For skeptics, there are alternatives to randomiza-
tion and to the complications of discretionary merits-based assign-
ment. And even if the only feasible options were merit assignment
and random assignment, additional justifications for randomization
ought to be explored.
b. An Outsider Defense
Only so much support for the system can be built by pointing at
improvements in the lives of judges, and random assignment has
costs for the rest of us. The discussion below argues for random
assignment from the perspective of outsiders. The argument's
overall structure is simple; it relies on ideas familiar from Part I.
Although doubts about the correct answer will persist, we can
identify the critical issues, assumptions, and trade-offs.
Assuming the perspective of parties to adjudication and the
public at large is an occasion for recharacterizing the issue. Those
managing the workload of adjudicative institutions often refer to
their procedures for "assignment of cases,' 2 66 and unsurprisingly so.
These insiders solve division of labor problems by assigning work
(cases) to workers (judges). But of course these workload allocations
simultaneously assign judges to cases, and cases are associated with
litigants. Assignment systems create relationships between those
266. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. R. 40.1 (1999).
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with adjudicative responsibility and those who require, or must
endure, the service. When evaluating the manner in which this
relationship is formed, "judge assignment" might be a better label
than "case assignment." The issue for institutional designers is not
only how judges prefer to get their cases, but how parties ought to
get their judges.
Because adjudicative institutions are often designed such that
disputants cannot share all of the available adjudicators,267 judge
assignment lotteries are facially plausible. Not every litigant in the
Southern District of New York can share the attention of all judges
assigned to that jurisdiction without serious waste. As we have
seen, lotteries offer a mechanism for sharing resources that are
otherwise indivisible.2 8 In addition, first-in-time rules will not solve
the case allocation problem. With adverse parties to each case, the
system has to confront divergent party preferences regarding the
identity of the appropriate decision maker. Of course, auctioning
judges is dangerous. Outcomes would bear an even greater relation
to party wealth and, if judges received the high bids, decision-maker
incentives would be influenced in harmful ways.269
But randomization is not the only option. Merit-based assignment
is also a possibility; the system might attempt to match adjudicator
abilities with case characteristics. This is akin to discretionary
assignment procedures that were more popular with judges in the
past. A second possibility is "political" assignment. That is, judges
could be assigned with regard to aggregated litigant preferences and
with less threat than an auction. Selection of arbitrators often
includes party preferences, if not by agreement on a particular arbi-
trator then by a procedure responsive to party objections and
desires."' In a similar spirit, but in more moderate fashion, many
267. Supreme courts and some high-ranking agency officials are an exception, and their
nominally broad oversight tends to come with a limited attention span.
268. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
269. See Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common
Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1220 (2007) (connecting jurisdictional expansion to fee-based
judging and competition among courts).
270. American Arbitration Association rules state that, in the absence of party agreement,
the parties will each strike and rank order potential arbitrators from a list provided by the
Association. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES R-11(b) (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440; Smith v. Am.
Arbitration Ass'n, 233 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing such a process); see also
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states now allow litigants peremptory strikes on the first judge
assigned to their case.271 This makes judge selection a bit more like
jury selection. Although a political assignment system might
operate in conjunction with randomization instead of replacing it, 272
political assignment would allow those directly affected by adjudica-
tion to limit the pool of judges who might control their case.
With at least one viable competitor to lotteries, there are two
remaining justifications for assignment randomization. These jus-
tifications adhere to the judge-assignment perspective, and they
track general justifications for randomization identified above:
sensible allocation of indivisible resources across apparently equal
claims, and reliable experimentation on judicial behavior. Together
with sensitivity to the judicial appointments process, they offer a
formidable argument for assignment randomization-even absent
any commitment to randomizing merits decisions.
First, random case assignment is an attractive way to distribute
a scarce and indivisible resource: decision-maker excellence. We
can always demand more of it, according to our own conceptions of
excellence. Realistically, however, judges and administrative offi-
cials will vary in competence, in ideology, and in the likelihood that
either attribute will influence their decisions. Given an irreducible
degree of variance among decision makers on the dimensions of
competence and ideology, random allocation of judges to parties and
their cases is a plausible response.
The argument is simplest for ideological variance. A constellation
of forces produce an ideological composition among decision
makers within a particular institution. In favor of tolerating or
even promoting ideological diversity is a list of arguments usually
connected with the appointments process. One might conclude that
such diversity properly reflects democratic forces and the changing
FRANK ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 185-86 (Marlin M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds.,
5th ed. 1997) (observing that labor-management arbitration agreements often provide that
each party will appoint their preferred arbitrator and then those panel members will agree
on a neutral chair); Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Adam C. Pritchard, Attorneys as
Arbitrators 6-7 (University of Michigan Law School, Olin Working Paper No. 09-001),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086372 (describing National Association of Securities
Dealers arbitration involving lists generated by rotation and party preferences).
271. See Norwood, supra note 196, at 293 & n.128.
272. Lists of potential judges or the first proposed judge could be selected by lottery.
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balance over time, that it equitably distributes positions of authority
across groups in society, or that it generates healthy debate within
institutions and fosters small-scale innovations from multiple
sources. Alternatively, one might simply surrender to the inescap-
able reality of ideological diversity. Even if one believes that
variance should be minimized through any possible means, a degree
of diversity will persist so long as our judges are human beings.
Randomized assignment plays off of a given mix of ideology and
equally distributes the probability of receiving any single decision
maker. Litigants might prefer a different mixture of judges in the
pool, but that is an argument at least equally well directed at the
appointments process, probably more so. If the mixture is accept-
able, it is reasonable to conclude that a fair way to treat the entire
class of litigants is to run lotteries on judges. This class might well
reach the same conclusion if they were able to deliberate together
over the matter. Random assignment maintains any behavioral
incentives flowing from the overall ideological composition of an
adjudicative institution, while offering a method for distributing
decision-maker ideology for those controversies that do find their
way into the given dispute resolution system. Random assignment
tends to follow choices concerning the appropriate mix of decision-
maker ideology, sensibly allocates those decision makers, and refers
objections to the mixture elsewhere. This reasoning is admittedly
parasitic, but it clarifies the functions of assignment randomization.
The application to variance in decision-maker competence is less
apparent. We have seen that randomization tends to make com-
petence deficits worse than they might otherwise be. Both merit-
based and political case assignment systems at least attempt to
match decision-maker attributes with case characteristics or party
preferences. Unconstrained randomization does not.273 Furthermore,
the possibility of addressing competence deficits at a location other
than case assignment (such as the creation of specialized courts, the
appointments stage, on appeal, through sanctions, or by the creation
of crude rules over open-ended standards) may not be an adequate
response. One might be tempted to contend that assignment ran-
273. I am assuming that incompetence is not occasionally desirable as a way of checking
problematic ideological influences-that relatively less competent ideologues are not better
than more competent ideologues.
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domization equally distributes the possibility of judicial error across
all litigants at the time of filing. In a sense this is true, although the
likely error rate is bound to differ across different types of cases.
The more fundamental objection is that error rates can be so tightly
connected to how judges are assigned to cases that randomization
makes the problem worse than it ought to be.
Insofar as random judge assignment is a more palatable alloca-
tion rule for ideological variance than for competence variance, it
follows that support for randomization should partly depend on the
mix of characteristics among judges. In one circumstance, compe-
tence will be of relatively minor concern while ideological differences
persist; in a different circumstance, diversity in competence will be
the leading problem. Many factors can influence this mix. For
example, an appointments process that does not screen well for
competence or that allows for specialists to succeed, coupled with
wide jurisdictional boundaries allowing for serious differences in
case type, will make random assignment more problematic. Either
the appointments process or jurisdictional boundaries can be
renovated to minimize the competence problem, but case assign-
ment is another tool for responding to the same issue. Ultimately,
then, the social desirability of random assignment will probably
turn on the feasibility of nonassignment design choices to address
low and diverse competence issues and the relative merits of
alternative case assignment systems.
For the sake of argument, we can adopt a few assumptions that
are charitable to an anti-randomization position. First, assume that
decision makers differ in competence levels and in which cases they
can resolve easily and correctly. Second, assume that the appoint-
ments process, the removal process, the jurisdictional boundaries,
and the substantive law are fixed--either because changing these
features is infeasible, or because they serve essential functions.
Third, assume that at least one other assignment system is possible,
such as assignment of judges to cases based on their skill sets or
political assignment involving party preferences. Under these con-
ditions, what is left to be said for the status quo of random assign-
ment over reform?
As an initial matter, adjustment for differing decision-maker skill
sets is not wholly incompatible with random assignment. A com-
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promise could be fashioned whereby officials judge which decision
makers are best suited to which case types,274 and, to the extent that
multiple decision makers fall into a category, they could be allocated
randomly. This stratified lottery solution could work in adjudicative
institutions with many decision makers and large dockets. In those
environments, the decision costs of ranking the suitability of each
available decision maker with respect to every incoming case will be
prohibitive. In fact, a rough and roughly stable categorization of
decision makers might ameliorate worries of abuse that come with
official discretion over judge assignment, and that motivate
arguments for randomization.275
There is a broader response, however. Random assignment helps
resolve the problem of uncertainty over what makes a good decision
maker. It obviates the need to build an unavoidably controversial
theory of adjudicator excellence into the case assignment stage.
Whatever qualities a good judge or administrative decision maker
should have, random case assignment will distribute those qualities
roughly equally across disputants. Of course society cannot do
without normative models of good and bad decision-maker behavior.
At a minimum, such models ought to inform the appointments
process and should match the incentives for selection into the pool
of potential decision makers. If, however, there is value in ad-
judicative institutions controlling their assignment systems, it
seems best that the institutions avoid interjecting their own senses
of excellence through a merits-based allocation rule that they
fashion and implement. Indeed, adoption of random case assign-
ment, where feasible, might be a way that judges retain control over
case assignment in the shadow of legislative intervention.
A final response is grounded in the value of experimentation. It
is at least as broad as any justification thus far, and it presses
274. The Patent and Trademark Office is an example of intra-institution specialization.
Patent applications are assigned to specialized technology units and then to individual
examiners. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE ch. 903.08 (2008).
275. Similar remarks apply to decision makers trading cases among themselves, although
ideological diversity will probably interfere with trades. Judges with very different worldviews
must be less likely to trade with each other when mutually valued outcomes are at stake. On
the other hand, intensely ideological judges of the same stripe might trade to maximize their
competence with different case types. This could amplify the influence of ideology on outcomes
over the baseline of random assignment without trading.
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against compromise on random assignment, even for the purpose of
matching decision-maker skills to congenial case types. Indeed, the
experimentation justification indicates random assignment should
be not only maintained but spread further.
The basic argument is straightforward. We are still learning
about the determinants of judicial behavior, and random assign-
ment is one of the best ways to accelerate that learning.276 By
randomly assigning a large number of cases to the pool of available
decision makers, confidence increases that each decision maker
will see a roughly similar mixture of controversies. Differences in
outcomes become more easily attributable to differences in decision
makers once observable and theoretically relevant factors are held
constant. The power of randomization in experimentation is
logically similar to its usefulness in clinical trials of new drugs.27 '
Of course, in the judge assignment application, the actual
motivation for randomization is hardly the development of experi-
mental knowledge. There is no indication that judges chose random
assignment to make themselves guinea pigs or to generate informa-
tion about their behavior for outsiders. But a natural experiment
can be as valuable as a designed experiment. The resulting in-
formation about judges can be used to predict future behavior and
plan accordingly, to inform the appointments process regarding the
likely consequences of choosing one decision maker over another,
and even to make suggestions about the case assignment process
itself or the jurisdictional boundaries of adjudicative institutions.
Hence the results of empirical studies on judicial behavior provide
support for complaints about it. We become more confident about
variation in decision-maker competence and ideology when empir-
icists capitalize on assignment randomization to make observations
about the relationship between decision makers and outcomes. The
mildly perverse upshot is that a target of understandable com-
plaint-random assignment in the face of diversity among decision
makers-is also one basis for testing those complaints.
276. See IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS 71-72 (2007) (characterizing random case
assignment across judges as a natural experiment on judicial behavior); Lynn M. LoPucki,
Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 495 (2009) (same).
277. See, e.g., MARKS, supra note 41, at 132-63.
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Without doubt, the information made available by random
assignment comes with disadvantages and perhaps diminishing
value. Some studies on judicial behavior seem to have a flair for
the obvious. Moreover, the best information on judges might never
be available to professional empiricists. Access to a lawyer who
practices before the institution in question will probably provide
better insight than a coefficient indicating how clumps of 'Ds" and
"Rs" tend to vote in some case category. There is some risk that the
new wave of empirical legal studies is an ill-fated fad, "a scientific
enterprise that seems to return so little from so much," as Lon
Fuller put it during an earlier surge of legal empiricism."' Even
those who maintain relatively high hopes for sophisticated empirical
inquiry into judicial behavior might not believe random assignment
is necessary. Other techniques could be adequate given what is
already known and what is lost with randomization. In any event,
these empirical studies concern behavior in cases that are actually
filed, and retaining randomization might thwart progress available
through modification of assignment systems.279 Pressing harder for
randomization threatens to convert the outsider perspective on
assignment into an academic perspective that is uniquely committed
to satisfying scholarly curiosity.
There is room for debate here, and it could be that any scholar's
judgment on the question is compromised. My view is that much is
left to learn about adjudicator behavior and that random assign-
ment is an important foundation for progress. Scholars are still
working out which factors are truly influential in judicial decision
making, the relative strength of those factors, and how they interact
278. Lon L. Fuller, An Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1604,
1622 (1966).
279. In particular, partisan balancing for decision-maker panels holds the potential for
progress. This has been suggested for the federal courts of appeals. See Tiller & Cross, supra
note 9. Partisan balancing might not devastate empirical conclusions based on the assumption
of random assignment, but it would tend to reduce their force. In any event, this suggestion
is not exportable to trial courts and other institutions that assign one decision maker to each
case. Moreover, we must be convinced that panels should be constructed to minimize
ideological variance in voting, rather than to permit a wider range of outcomes for the
purposes of experimentation and debate. Furtermore, ideological variance across judges will
not necessarily affect behavior outside the courtroom differently from zero variance. Potential
litigants might adjust either way.
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with each other.28 ° For instance, there is little remaining doubt that
the policy preferences of at least some judges influence outcomes in
at least some cases, but there is much debate over the magnitude of
that influence.2"' It has to be compared to conventional legal
authorities, attorney quality, strategic considerations involving
nonjudicial institutions and public opinion, parochial institutional
or professional norms, and so on. As well, common proxies for
variables of interest are imperfect by definition and feed an
irreducible margin of error. In this vein, many studies use attenu-
ated proxies, such as the identity of the appointing president, to
group judges into ideological categories.282 Few existing studies
seem to deliver individualized information,283 leaving us with
imprecise measures of decision-maker variation within institutions.
c. A Political Allocation Alternative
With all of this in mind, probably the strongest competitor to
random assignment is a political assignment system that incorpo-
rates litigant preferences. We have seen the problems of a merit-
based assignment system whereby officials attempt to match judge
skills with case characteristics. Official discretion can be exercised
poorly, skewed by self-interest, and unsustainable when judges feel
equally entitled to cases. Political assignment, however, has hopes
of outperforming merit-based systems on certain measures.
Political assignment in this context means that judges receive
less control over which cases they receive while litigants enjoy
280. See generally Samaha, Judicial Transparency, supra note 243.
281. See id.
282. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 321 (2002) (using newspaper editorials); Frank B. Cross &
Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168 (1998) (assigning political party
affiliation by reference to the nominating president); see also Robert Anderson IV & Alexander
M. Tahk, Institutions and Equilibrium in the United States Supreme Court, 101 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 811, 811-12 (2007) (noting common simplifying assumptions of one-dimensional policy
space and binary choices); Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology,
and How Should We Measure It? 3-4 (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 08-47), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121228 (finding problems ofunderspecification, observable proxies,
and unidimensional assumptions).
283. For two counterexamples in the immigration field, see supra text accompanying notes
231-32.
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more. It therefore shares with random assignment the aspiration
of minimizing adjudicator discretion and its risks. A potential
difference is that political assignment might better serve the
general public interest. Political assignment might address the
problem of diversity in decision-maker competence, a problem which
random assignment tends to exacerbate. It likewise creates public
information about decision-maker characteristics, albeit in a
different way.
Although selfish parties presumably prefer victory regardless of
adjudicator competence, a political assignment system would be
designed to equalize the influence of all sides to a dispute on the
decision maker's identity. It should cancel out those desires for
victory while retaining the potential to steer cases toward those
judges best able to handle them. Judges who display intense
ideological commitments in a given field should be less likely to
receive such cases. And, to the extent that parties cannot influence
the decision maker's ideology, they might choose to maximize
expected decision-maker efficiency as a second-best. At least one
party is likely to prefer competence to incompetence. Furthermore,
litigant migration to one judge instead of another reveals outsider
perceptions about how those judges process a particular type of case.
If that information were accessible, the aggregation of previous
litigant choices would present a rough index of the ex ante desirabil-
ity of each decision maker to prospective litigants and other
observers. The details of a political assignment procedure must be
resolved-such as whether to follow arbitration models and how to
allot peremptory strikes. But the general virtues of political
assignment are clear enough.
Random assignment still enjoys advantages, however, at least if
we take elements of the current adjudication system as given. First,
the benefits of political assignment are more pronounced when
workload can vary across decision makers. If workload must be
evenly distributed, then a ceiling is imposed on the influence of
party preferences. If workload is allowed to vary, then the most
popular and hopefully the most excellent judges are "rewarded" with
a larger docket. Some decision makers will be perfectly happy with
that result; they will appreciate the relative power and prestige.
Others, we must worry, will increase their leisure time by develop-
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ing a subpar reputation and frightening litigants away from their
chambers. If we are considering political assignment for federal
judges, there is the question whether the impeachment process is
adequate to temper that threat. One immediate reaction to this
complication is to compensate judges more generously for perform-
ing more work. But the dangers of that response are also apparent:
judges then have an incentive, even beyond reputation and prestige,
for maximizing jurisdiction.2"
Although these difficulties might not be crippling, broader
questions must be confronted. The first regards the true public
value of litigant preferences. It is not clear that the most popular
judges among litigants are the best judges in the best sense of that
word, or the best fit for the cases they receive. The basic concern is
not that lawyers will give poor advice to their clients about which
judges to strike; the issue is the distance between the aggregated
preferences of actual litigants and the resulting quality of law
and precedent for everyone else. It is more than possible that the
interests of actual litigants are unhappily skewed compared to
others influenced by law. Perhaps one party to every dispute will
exert whatever influence they have to obtain the least legally
competent and most ideologically intense decision maker. This
would dampen the public value of information on judge popularity
while driving down the average quality of judging. Litigant mi-
gration, when all parties have a hand on the steering wheel, might
well systematically arrive at judicial mediocrity.2"5
In any event, the likely distributional outcomes of a political
assignment system should be evaluated with reference to another
284. See Klerman, supra note 269, at 1220 (studying English history).
285. Predicting which decision-maker types are most likely to be selected depends, in part,
on whether litigants and their lawyers tend to be optimistic. Compare Linda Babcock &
George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J.
ECON. PERSP. 109, 109-12 (1997) (comparing self-serving biases to uncertainty and strategic
behavior), and Christine Jolla, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1501-04 (1996) (similar), with Stephanos Bibas,
Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2498-2504 (2004)
(suggesting effects of overconfidence, self-serving biases, and denial on plea bargaining
outcomes across different defendants). If all sides are, for some reason, optimistic about their
chances for victory, then the result might be an extremely competent though ideologically
moderate decision maker in charge of their dispute. This suggests a positive role for a
cognitive bias. However, even if optimism is widespread in litigation, it likely generates other,
potentially costly consequences-such as inhibition of settlement.
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component of institutional design: the appointments process for
adjudicators. The proposal for reform would have to square with
the assumptions of the appointments process as we know it. That
process creates a shifting mix of personnel based on decisions of the
Senate, the president, and the political forces that influence them.
In fact, the appointments process cannot be separated from the
post-appointment assignment system. Appointment is, functionally
speaking, the first step in the process of matching decision makers
to decisions. Thus matching judges to litigants is something like
The Dating Game, where matches were not only a product of player
choices but also player screening that took place pre-game and off-
screen.
In this regard, random assignment tends to follow the mixture of
judges produced by the appointments process, while political
assignment will probably not. In an important sense, political
assignment moves some power over the character of the federal
courts from the appointments system to lawyers and the litigants
who retain them. This power shift is no objection standing alone.
Rather, it is a suggestion of deep issues tightly linked to seemingly
mundane questions of institutional detail.
Equally important, the impact on the appointments process
implicates the feasibility and stability of a substantially revised
judge assignment process. Members of Congress are apparently
satisfied with a generally random assignment system, and they
could quickly become skeptical of any serious shifts to litigant
control or judicial specialization in the assignment process. A
sensible judge assignment system within the courts must be
consistent with the assumptions of the "pre-game" appointments
process.8 6
At this point, institutional designers must face deep and com-
plicated questions of value and strategy. The process by which
judges are matched with cases might be viewed as a tedious and
uninteresting issue of paper-pushing. The truth is that the assign-
ment process is an influential component in the overall system of
286. Assignment systems for elected judges and for administrative officials are distinct, but
the basic questions are similar. Assignment systems should be evaluated in conjunction with
other design choices, including the appointments process, as well as our goals for the
institution in question.
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adjudication. Random assignment and political assignment are just
two imaginable choices with two distinct sets of implications for the
system as a whole. Given debatable goals for adjudicative institu-
tions and some uncertainty about likely outcomes following from
different assignment systems, it might be tempting to suggest that
the viable assignment options themselves be randomized. Instead,
I would return to a different tiebreaker.
Random assignment provides one of the most reliable ways to
learn the determinants of judicial behavior. That possibility for
insight is already limited by a variety of jurisdictional boundaries.
Steering cases to popular judges would further restrict the natural
experiment that random assignment provides, similar to the re-
strictions imposed by a discretionary merit-based assignment
process. If the resulting understandings were only useful to
potential litigants and their lawyers, random assignment would be
a less attractive option. Those classes have alternative and some-
times reliable sources of information. But their judgments about
sitting judges for whom experience-based evaluations are available
will at least occasionally misfire. Moreover, even when those
judgments are accurate, they will not always line up with the
informational needs of others. Perhaps most important, the process
of appointing judges operates on suppositions about how potential
judges will perform as actual judges in the future. The characteris-
tics of the most popular judges among parties are not what the
appointments process does or should value.
This brings us to an uncomfortable reality associated with ran-
domization as a method of experimentation. This reality applies
beyond judicial assignments and should be accounted for however
one wishes to resolve the issues of randomization in adjudication.
Randomization promises insights into how systems behave and, at
their best, those insights suggest reasons for reform. But sometimes
a plausible reform turns away from randomization and thereby
eliminates one technique for continued understanding of the system.
This is not a reason for entrenching randomization. It is, instead, a
recommendation that alternative reforms be seriously considered
before a reliable source of information is discarded. For the topic at
hand, the operation of adjudicative institutions, there are multiple
dimensions of design choices that can achieve similar results. We
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should be relatively sure that those alternatives are unacceptable
before rolling back random assignment and the growing base of
knowledge that it is coincidentally helping to create.
CONCLUSION
With a better understanding of how randomization functions
comes a better understanding of when it is beneficial. I have
outlined overlapping justifications for the deliberate use of statisti-
cally or orthogonally random processes. These justifications do not
reduce to a simple prescription. But they do provide guidance, and
they help us investigate what might appear to be an incoherent
approach to randomization in adjudication. Many adjudicative
institutions have committed to randomizing their decision makers
across cases and to never randomizing merits decisions in those
cases. This is, to some extent, an ineffectual distinction. Yet the
vagaries of randomization's optimal domain make a case for the
prohibition, while the advantages in allocation and experimentation
provide reasons for encouraging randomization at the point of
assignment. More could be said about these policies. This much is
enough to see that randomization is a fixture in government
decision making-even in our judiciaries-and that it can be an
element of justice and innovation rather than a surrender to fortune
or fate.
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